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Article 
Financial Crisis Containment 
ANNA GELPERN 
This Article maps financial crisis containment—extraordinary measures to 
stop the spread of financial distress—as a category of legal and policy choice.  I 
make three claims.  
First, containment is distinct from financial regulation, crisis prevention and 
resolution.  Containment is brief; it targets the immediate term.  It involves claims 
of emergency, rule-breaking, time inconsistency and moral hazard.  In contrast, 
regulation, prevention and resolution seek to establish sound incentives for the 
long term.  Second, containment decisions deviate from non-crisis norms in 
predictable ways, and are consistent across diverse countries and crises.  
Containment invariably entails three kinds of choices: choices between wholesale 
and case-by-case response to financial distress, choices about whether to enforce 
private contracts and government regulations, and choices about distributing 
losses from crisis. I illustrate these with case studies from Indonesia in 1997–
1998, Japan in 1994–1998, the United States in 1933, Argentina in 2001–2002, 
and Mexico in 1982.  Third, containment measures are costly, but so is failure to 
distinguish containment from other tasks.  Governments use prevention and 
regulation rhetoric to delay crisis response and to obscure distribution.  Once they 
admit to a crisis, officials may leverage the urgency of containment to secure far-
reaching economic reform.   
Isolating and mapping containment can help recast well-worn crisis policy 
debates, and make crisis response more transparent and accountable. 
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Financial Crisis Containment 
ANNA GELPERN∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION: BEAR STEARNS, NORTHERN ROCK AND  
MEMORIES OF SEOUL   
On the evening of March 13, 2008, U.S. Treasury officials got on the 
phone with their colleagues at the Federal Reserve and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.1  A big investment bank was on the verge of 
bankruptcy in deeply stressed credit markets.  Bear Stearns had a network 
of large, complex positions that linked it with many parts of the U.S. and 
global financial system.  Faced with the risk of widespread collapse, the 
regulators arranged a shotgun marriage between Bear and its banker, J.P. 
Morgan, complete with a $30 billion dowry from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.2  
The episode is an example of financial crisis containment,3 a category 
of extraordinary policy measures to stop the spread of untold economic 
damage, akin to containing a fire or infectious disease.  Despite the rhetoric 
of exception that surrounds every instance of containment, even a casual 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Rutgers School of Law—Newark.  I am grateful to Robert Ahdieh, Joshua Blank, William 
Bratton, Lee Buchheit, Giselle Datz, Kevin Davis, Onnig Dombalagian, Adam Feibelman, Michael 
Froomkin, Mitu Gulati, Eric Helleiner, Howell Jackson, Melissa Jacoby, Sky Julian, Chris Kushlis, 
Thomas Laryea, Adam Levitin, Anthony Marcus, Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Patricia McCoy, Ralf 
Michaels, Russell Munk, Louis Pauly, Adam Posen, Heidi Schooner, Steven Schwarcz, Brad Setser, 
David Skeel, David Snyder, Edwin M. Truman, Matthew Tubin, Alan White, Arthur Wilmarth, David 
Zaring and the participants in conferences and workshops of Seton Hall University School of Law, 
University of Connecticut School of Law, CIGI/University of Waterloo, the Canadian Law and 
Economics Association, Duke University School of Law, American University Washington College of 
Law, George Washington University School of Law, the American Association of Law Schools and the 
International Studies Association for helpful insights, to Sarah Jaramillo, A.J. LaRosa and Kelly 
Targett for excellent research assistance, to the editors of this volume for valuable input and patience, 
and to the Dean’s Fund at Rutgers—Newark for financial support. 
1 See, e.g., Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial 
Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 1 (Apr. 3, 2008) 
(statement of Timothy F. Geithner, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), available 
at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/OpgStmtGeithner4308Testimony.pdf. 
2 JPMorgan Chase & Co. and the Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Summary of Terms and 
Conditions (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/ 
Contract.pdf.  The loan was later reduced to $29 billion.  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Summary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan Chase Facility (Mar. 24, 2008), available 
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080324b.html.  
3 I use the term with apologies to George Kennan, who in 1947 famously advocated “long-term, 
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies,” framing U.S. foreign 
policy under the rubric of containment for decades after.  X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 566 (1947).  My use differs somewhat from Kennan’s, especially with respect to 
time horizons, though the element of damage control remains.   
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inquiry reveals it to be a fixture of global finance. 
In November 1997, the fourth largest securities house in Japan fell 
after disclosing massive hidden debts. The image of Yamaichi Securities’ 
president crying at the press conference4 became an icon of Japan’s “lost 
decade.”  The government had tried to persuade Yamaichi’s bank to take 
over the business.  The bank refused, itself under water.  The firm folded, 
but not before drawing billions in public funds to pay its creditors—an 
effort to avoid further disruption to fragile domestic and global markets.5   
In August 1997, foreigners stopped lending to Korean banks.6  To 
shore up confidence, the Korean government announced a blanket 
guarantee of bank liabilities.7  U.S. and U.K. officials were indignant: the 
guarantee would bail out the reckless, and encourage more recklessness.8  
In any event, the guarantee failed to stop the slide.  Finance ministers from 
the world’s richest economies spent the next Christmas pleading with the 
world’s top bankers to renew loans to Korean banks.9 
In September 2007, a British bank called Northern Rock had trouble 
refinancing its debt in the increasingly wobbly global markets. To halt a 
run on deposits, the U.K. authorities reprised Korea’s blanket guarantee of 
the banking system, and soon nationalized Northern Rock.10 
In December 2001, Argentina devalued its currency and defaulted on 
$100 billion in foreign bonds, capping off a year of political turmoil, bank 
runs and deepening economic depression.  The government then converted 
                                                                                                                          
4 GILLIAN TETT, SAVING THE SUN: HOW WALL STREET MAVERICKS SHOOK UP JAPAN’S 
FINANCIAL WORLD AND MADE BILLIONS 105 (2004). 
5 HIROSHI NAKASO, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN JAPAN DURING 
THE 1990S: HOW THE BANK OF JAPAN RESPONDED AND THE LESSONS LEARNT 9–11 (2001), available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap06.pdf?noframes=1; TETT, supra note 4, at xxiii, 106. 
6 PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
AND HUMBLED THE IMF 125 (2001).  
7 MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CURES, AND SYSTEMIC 
IMPLICATIONS 39 (1998); Carl-Johan Lindgren et al., Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: 
Lessons from Asia, 16 n.17 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 188, 1999), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/opFinsec/op188.pdf.  The initial guarantee was limited to a 
vaguely defined category of external liabilities.  Id.  It was expanded to all liabilities in November.  Id. 
at 18–19.   
8 See GROUP OF TWENTY-TWO (G-22) WORKING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES, 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES 7–9 (1998), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/ifcrep.pdf; G-22 WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS vi-vii, 20–21, 25, 27, 33, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/sfsrep.pdf (criticizing 
blanket guarantees extended in financial crisis and reflecting the policy sentiment of the day). 
9 BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 198–202.. 
10 See e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE ROCK, FIFTH REPORT 
OF SESSION 2007–08, 36–37, 140–41 (2008), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf; David Stringer, Britain to Nationalize Northern Rock 
Bank, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2008, at A-11.  For one of many criticisms of the nationalization of 
Northern Rock, see William Buiter’s Maverecon blog for FT.com.  Immoral Hazard and Northern 
Rock, available at http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2008/02/immoral-hazard-and-northern-rock/ (Feb. 
19, 2008, 18:58 EST).  
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all dollar-denominated domestic debt contracts and bank deposits into 
devalued pesos.  Argentine courts upheld the measure to rewrite private 
contracts, citing Argentine precedent that relied on U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence from the 1930s.11 
In these cases and many others like them, rules were suspended as 
policymakers tried to hang on to the precipice.  A different set of 
regularities replaced them.  This Article is an effort to describe the new 
regularities, which comprise containment, and to show why it is important 
to conceive of them as a distinct category of legal and policy choice. 
Containment is often conflated with financial regulation, crisis 
prevention and resolution.  These are all long-term projects that share the 
goal of entrenching sound economic incentives, often embodied in positive 
rules.  In contrast, containment is urgent and brief, defined by rule-
breaking, claims of exception and the dearth of positive law.  The 
paramount goal is “to stop the bleeding”;12 the long view falls by the 
wayside.  As they practice containment, formerly stern and stingy officials 
dole out bailouts and sow the seeds of future gambling—time 
inconsistency and moral hazard problems loom large.  
The persistent specter of such problems helps explain why containment 
inhabits a negative space in law and policy, unacknowledged in the run-up 
to crisis and renounced in its aftermath.  Judging financial crisis 
containment by the standards of regulation, prevention and resolution is 
doomed to yield a failing grade and a feckless promise to hold firm the 
next time.  Acknowledging and defining containment opens it to critical 
analysis.  On the one hand, isolating containment helps explain why some 
well-worn paradigms—sanctity of contracts, moral hazard, and the 
liquidity-solvency distinction—fall so flat so consistently in crisis after 
crisis.  On the other hand, it reveals the importance of other ideas, such as 
distribution, accountability, and path dependence, which receive less 
attention than they should. 
This Article maps containment using examples from Asia, Latin 
America and the United States.  Although each episode involves a 
departure from non-crisis norms for resolving financial distress, such 
departures follow a consistent pattern across radically different crises in 
                                                                                                                          
11 See Horacio Spector, Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect, 83 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 129, 142–44 (2008) (pointing to the reliance of the Argentine courts on Home Building & Loan 
Ass’n v. Blaisdell in the Avico v. de la Pesa, Bustos v. Estadio Nationale and Massa v. Poder Ejecutivo 
National cases, which applied the doctrine of economic emergency). 
12 See, e.g., Paul R. LaMonica, Commentary: The Fed Tries to Stop the Bleeding, CNNMONEY, 
Sep. 18, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/18/markets/thebuzz/index.htm?postversion=200809 
1814; Robert Gavin, A Plan to Stop the Bleeding: Federal Authorities Would Buy Troubled Mortgages, 
Securities; Support in Congress Likely, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, BGLOBE file (referring, respectively, to a plan by central banks to inject liquidity into 
the markets, and a proposal by the U.S. Treasury to buy troubled mortgage assets from financial 
institutions). 
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rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian states.  First, faced with the 
prospect of mass default, policy makers choose between case-by-case and 
wholesale response.  Second, they decide whether to enforce private 
contracts and their own regulations.  Third, they begin to allocate losses 
from the crisis among their constituents. 
Financial distress in ordinary times is resolved case-by-case, through 
renegotiation, default, or bankruptcy.13  These tools rely on market 
valuation and an administrative infrastructure designed for a relatively low 
rate of failure in the economy.  In crisis, they may be inadequate: markets 
vanish, and with them, market valuation; panic, contagion and widespread 
distress overwhelm the resolution infrastructure.  Yet the alternative—
wholesale subsidies or across-the-board restructuring—is unappealing.  By 
definition, it is over- and under-inclusive: it may fail the prudent, save the 
profligate, and spawn moral hazard. 
Governments generally enforce private contracts, except in 
bankruptcy, where contracts yield to a public debt adjustment proceeding.  
Enforcing contracts in crisis can exacerbate distress.  For example, where a 
large portion of all debtors cannot pay, enforcement may trigger spillover 
effects throughout the economy.  Separately, otherwise unobjectionable 
contract terms—such as those indexing debts to gold or foreign currency—
if widespread, may bring on financial instability.14  In either case, 
individual creditors have no incentive to compromise for the sake of the 
economy.15  In response, governments may assume private debts or rewrite 
private contracts.16  Assuming debts costs public money; failure to enforce 
contracts is costly in a different way: it can disrupt commercial 
expectations, and undermine both incentives to perform and faith in the 
rule of law.17 
                                                                                                                          
13 Bankruptcy is a collective proceeding for creditors; however, each debtor’s case is resolved 
individually. 
14 Debt contracts indexed to foreign currency or commodity prices are designed to offset the 
effects of devaluation.  Where the domestic currency declines in value, indexation increases the debt 
burden and eliminates the policy benefits of devaluation.  This aggregate effect does not depend on any 
particular borrower’s capacity to perform any given contract.  Anne-Marie Gulde et al., Dealing with 
Banking Crises in Dollarized Economies, in MANAGING FINANCIAL CRISES: RECENT EXPERIENCE AND 
LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICA 54 (Charles Collyns & G. Russell Kincaid eds., 2003). 
15 This is distinct from creditor collective action problems with respect to a single debtor, which 
are addressed in a single collective bankruptcy proceeding. 
16 NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS 87–93 (2004) (summarizing the 
choices and related economic literature).  For legal perspectives on enforcing contracts in crisis, see, for 
example, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (establishing the 
constitutionality of state foreclosure moratoria), and Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When 
Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 449–50 
(1993) (discussing the effects of enforcing municipal debts during the Great Depression). 
17 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 449. (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“He simply closes his eyes to the 
necessary implication of [this] decision who fails to see in it the potentiality of future gradual but ever-
advancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private and public contracts.”); see also Spector, supra 
note 11, at 145. 
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Similarly, in ordinary times, governments enforce their own 
regulations.  Doing so in crisis may backfire.  For example, where a large 
portion of the financial system becomes undercapitalized because its 
borrowers are broke, strictly enforcing capital and accounting rules may 
mean shutting down most banks and cutting off the credit essential to 
recovery. 
Each containment episode also entails loss distribution, which is 
distinct from and in addition to loss limitation.  Losses from financial 
distress initially fall on debtors and creditors: a debtor may pay and fail, or 
default, shifting loss onto creditors.  Such losses may have spillover 
effects, or may be politically unacceptable in their own right.  In response, 
government restructuring mandates can allocate losses between debtors 
and creditors.  An infusion of public money can shift losses onto taxpayers.  
New private capital can absorb some of the losses.  Public or private 
money from abroad can spread the burden to foreigners.   
Unlike loss limitation, distribution is politically costly.  It requires 
governments to choose among constituents, such as homeowners in Ohio, 
investment banks in New York that repackaged their mortgages, and 
municipalities in Florida or Norway that bought them. 
In sum, containment may call for measures—wholesale treatment, 
rewriting contracts, suspending regulations, and distributing losses—that 
are legally and politically fraught.  Governments delay and obscure such 
measures as long as possible.  Once forced to admit a crisis, officials may 
leverage the sunk political cost of containment to transform the economic 
landscape, for example, by enacting comprehensive regulation or creating 
vast new power centers in the form of merged financial institutions.  
Conflating containment with other kinds of financial policy can mask large 
wealth transfers and major institutional change; it can make political 
choices look technical and inevitable, reduce accountability and increase 
the social cost of a crisis.  
Starting with a description of containment as a category, this Article 
seeks to shift the terms of the debate about crisis response.  I argue that 
much of what appears as rule-breaking in containment is neither good nor 
bad, but unavoidable.  Legal and institutional design for crisis response 
should reflect this reality, with channels of accountability appropriate to 
the tasks of containment.  Part II sets out the context in which containment 
decisions arise.  Part III examines the relationship between containment 
and prevention, regulation, and resolution, and the literature on economic 
emergency.  Part IV describes the recurring elements of containment: the 
choice between wholesale and case-by-case response, the decision to 
enforce, suspend or rewrite private contracts and regulations, and 
judgments about distribution in crisis.  Part V presents five crisis case 
studies.  Part VI concludes with policy implications. 
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II.  THE OBJECT OF CONTAINMENT 
Containment choices as described in this Article arise in a particular 
subset of financial crises.  Such crises are usually called systemic, either in 
the sense that they threaten the financial system as a whole, or, less 
frequently, in the sense that they threaten large parts of the economy 
through finance channels.18  Because the meaning of “systemic” is the 
subject of a debate not directly relevant to my project,19 I use this Part to 
highlight specific crisis attributes that would prompt policy makers to 
consider a containment response.  In sum, if it is big enough, bad enough, 
and moving fast and far enough, financial distress will as a matter of fact 
prompt containment. 
A.  Scope 
A crisis that brings on containment usually imperils large parts of the 
domestic, and occasionally global, financial system.  This in turn threatens 
the macroeconomy: economic growth, employment, prices, and 
government finances.  The ultimate concern is economic harm to a great 
number of people.  The number of financial firms at risk can be telling but 
is not dispositive: mass failures usually merit containment, but so does the 
                                                                                                                          
18 This is the sense in which the word “systemic” is used in the phrase “systemic corporate crisis”.  
See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Systemic Corporate Distress: A Legal Perspective, in RESOLUTION 
OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DESIGN OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS 57 
(Stijn Claessens et al., eds., 2001). 
19 See generally SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION 76, 101 (Patrick 
Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005) (linking containment and systemic risk).  Debates over the 
definition of systemic risk usually take place in the context of systemic risk regulation.  COMMITTEE ON 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, RISK MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMIC RISK: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
THIRD JOINT CENTRAL BANK RESEARCH CONFERENCE 1–13 (2002), available at  
http://www.bis.org/cgfs/conf/mar02.pdf (illustrating the evolution of official concern with systemic 
risk); Timothy F. Geithner, President and C.E.O. of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks to the 
Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference: Systemic Financial Crises-Resolving Large Bank 
Insolvencies (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r041011a.pdf; Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (citing uncertainty 
surrounding the definition and proposing to expand the concept of systemic risk beyond banks to 
financial markets). 
Because containment seeks to limit damage now spreading through known channels, it does not 
raise the same information, incentive, or administrative resource concerns as ex-ante systemic risk 
regulation.  Regulation targets multiple risks at once without necessarily knowing the precise source, 
magnitude or even nature of the harm that might come.  Labeling risk from a future hypothetical event 
as “systemic” is significant in the regulatory context because it may bring on broader, stricter oversight, 
more overseers, and more generous insurance, perhaps with durable behavior changes among market 
actors.  In contrast, containment happens ex-post, when the harm has either materialized, or has become 
much more certain.  At this stage, calling the crisis “systemic” means that “the system” is in present 
danger, which justifies an exceptional, perhaps wholesale, public response.  Thus when the term 
“systemic crisis” is used as a predicate for containment policies, it is almost invariably ex-post, 
instrumental, and political.  This is contrary to the regulatory aspiration in  Steven Schwarcz’s recent 
proposal: “[S]ystemic risk is an economic, not a political, definition.  It should not be used uncritically 
as an ex post political label for any large financial failure or downturn.”  Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 
supra, at 204.  As I note in Part III, Schwarcz’s goal is to establish a regulatory regime.  I argue that 
containment is different, not least in its political content. 
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failure of one large government savings bank that holds a significant 
portion of the people’s deposits, or one large hedge fund with contractual 
links to many others.  An entity’s nodal position is important because it can 
transmit distress far and wide.  In addition, the failure of a financial 
institution that supports important sectors of the real economy, such as 
housing, can be critical even if it does not immediately affect the broader 
markets.  Disruption of market infrastructure, such as payments and 
clearing systems, is important on its own and in conjunction with firm 
failure.20 
To some extent, the authorties’ response determines whether a crisis is 
perceived as one of mass individual insolvency or large institutional 
failure.  For example, where rescue measures focus on institutions that are 
too big or too interconnected to fail,21 they come to define a crisis.  In the 
same crisis, individual insolvency may be pervasive, but it recedes from 
public view when the policy response to it is indirect, channeled through 
institutions.   
B.  Path and Pace 
Crises spread through two kinds of transmission mechanisms, which 
are not mutually exclusive.  First, in a chain reaction, failure travels from 
one or several entities to others throughout the financial system.22  For 
example, a run on one badly-managed bank can cause runs on banks with 
contractual or ownership links to it, as well as copy-cat runs on good banks 
unconnected with the original culprit.23  Second, a common shock (for 
                                                                                                                          
20 Howell E. Jackson, Systemic Risk after Glass-Steagall Reform (July 12, 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).  
21 On the role of contractual and institutional “interconnectedness” in transmitting risk throughout 
the financial system, see, for example , Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Controlling Systemic Risk in an Era of 
Financial Consolidation, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW (2002, 2005); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, 
International Standards for Consolidated Supervision of Financial Conglomerates: Controlling 
Systemic Risk, 19 BROOK. J.INT’L 137, 138–42 (1993), Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge 
Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 20 (Working Paper, 2009) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1339628_code349188.pdf?abstractid=1249441&mi
rid=1; Gillian Tett & Krishna Guha, The Cost of a Lifeline, FT.COM, Apr. 24, 2008, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9812cd96-1197-11dd-a93b-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1. 
22 Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J.  
POL. ECON. 401 (1983); see also Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 196–97 (2008). 
23 The two transmission mechanisms within the chain reaction category may be seen as distinct: 
distress may spread through real links among dissimilar institutions (banks, hedge funds, 
manufacturers), or through imitation among those perceived to share similar vulnerabilities (banks).  
Yehning Chen, Banking Panics: The Role of the First-Come, First-Served Rule and Information 
Externalities, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A READER 359 
(Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Optimal Currency 
Crises, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A READER, supra, at 
379. 
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example, a currency collapse) can affect everyone simultaneously.24  Some 
regulatory measures, such as a sudden change in provisioning rules, can 
have the effect of a common shock, especially when the financial sector as 
a whole is undercapitalized.  International transmission mechanisms are 
essentially similar.25 
The pace at which a crisis unfolds is important in its own right.  A 
sudden loss of confidence in institutions, such as banks, or in a country’s 
currency, can trigger a run.  Depositors or investors demand safe assets 
(cash, hard currency, precious metals) and may rush to sell all at once, 
depressing asset values.  Certain kinds of contractual arrangements, such as 
lending on margin, can mechanically replicate this effect: as the value of 
collateral declines, “margin calls” for additional collateral can cause 
market participants to liquidate assets en masse, setting off a spiral of 
further losses.26  Run-style crises can develop in a matter of hours, though 
many have underlying causes that go back years.  Other crises unfold in 
slow motion, in tandem with a deepening economic slump, which might 
cause the supply of capital to dry up as non-performing loans mount.  It 
may take years of loosely connected failures and ad-hoc responses before 
the authorities recognize a system-wide pattern that prompts a change of 
course, including broader, more muscular containment measures.  
C.  Timing: You Know You Are in Crisis When  
Deciding when financial distress justifies resort to extraordinary tools 
is one of the most daunting policy challenges in crisis.  In his classic case 
for public intervention, Charles P. Kindleberger addressed timing with 
cheeky understatement:  
Timing presents a special problem.  After a crash has 
occurred, it is important to wait long enough for the insolvent 
firms to fail, but not so long as to let the crisis spread to the 
solvent firms that need liquidity . . . Whether too soon and 
too much is worse than too little and too late is difficult to 
specify.27 
The economics and politics of timing are equally intractable.  
                                                                                                                          
24 COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP II, TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 5–7 (2005), available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org 
/crmpg2/docs /CRMPG-II.pdf; Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial 
Supervision and Regulation?, 49 CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES, 181, 189–90 (2003), available at 
http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/49/2/181.  
25 ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 43–44. 
26 Compare MAURY KLEIN, RAINBOW’S END: THE CRASH OF 1929, 237–38 (2001) (effect of 
margin calls in 1929), with Posting of Yves Smith to nakedcapitalism blog, http://www. 
nakedcapitalism.com/2008/10/are-hedge-fund-margin-calls-leading-to.html (Oct. 10, 2008, 15:00 EST) 
(effect of margin calls in 2008). 
27 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS & CRASHES 13, 209 (5th ed. 2005). 
 2009] FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTAINMENT 1061 
Recognizing that a financial crisis threatens the economy can amount to 
admitting policy failure.  Announcing that mass bankruptcy is nigh may 
undermine confidence further.28  In many cases, including those discussed 
later in this Article, it may bring on a political crisis.  Deploying 
extraordinary measures too early may damage incentives to perform 
contracts and monitor risk among debtors and creditors.  On the other 
hand, the risk of delay is particularly acute in a big, fast-moving financial 
crisis.  Waiting until everyone agrees on the magnitude of the threat may 
mean flying off the cliff. 
In practice, the timing of containment does not depend on real or 
perceived economic necessity alone, but also on political and legal 
possibility.  Containment is not one seamless, externally determined phase 
of a crisis, but rather a series of political decisions that may come in 
concentrated spurts, or over time, alongside decisions on prevention, 
regulation and restructuring.  Their focus on the immediate term 
distinguishes containment decisions from the others; incidents such as the 
Bear Stearns sale, which began this Article, acquire their singular status 
through a combination of perceived threat, government response and 
perfect hindsight.  In all cases discussed in Part V, containment could have 
come earlier or later, depending on one’s view of the underlying 
economics.29  Political acceptance of extraordinary measures was critical to 
their economic and legal viability, and helped set their timing. 
As a matter of fact, in every big financial crisis, there comes a time 
when the authorities recognize that measures used to handle non-crisis 
distress may not be enough—which is when they ask their staff to prepare 
memos with “Plan B” in the title. 
A government might consider containment when the country’s firms 
must pay foreign debt twenty times the size of its hard currency reserves, 
as happened in Korea in 1997.30  Extraordinary response may be in order 
when more than half of all firms in the economy are technically insolvent, 
as happened in Indonesia in 1998,31 or when the local currency has lost 
                                                                                                                          
28 Id.; ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 42 (describing shock from “disclosure of bad news”); 
TETT, supra note 4, at 69 (2004) (contrasting Japanese regulatory forbearance with Swedish 
enforcement: “We didn’t want to create panic in the financial markets or among consumers.  We 
wanted to deal with the problems slowly and calmly.” (quoting Ministry of Finance official)).  But see 
Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts? (U. Penn. Inst. for L. and Econ. 
Research Paper, No. 09-11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362639 
(arguing that bankruptcy of a major financial firm in an advanced institutional setting need not trigger 
panic). 
29 In the overwhelming majority of cases, the consensus is earlier. 
30 See, e.g., BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 182. 
31 See, e.g., Timothy Lane, et al., IMF Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A 
Preliminary Assessment 4–5 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 178, 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/op/op178/OP178.pdf. 
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three-quarters of its value, as happened in Argentina in early 2002.32  Time 
may be ripe for containment when private banks no longer heed the 
government’s pleas to rescue ailing comrades, as happened in Japan in 
199733—or when the authorities shut down three hundred savings 
institutions, and over six hundred line up the resolution pike, as happened 
in the United States in the late 1980s.34  So too it might be as officials get 
on the phone at night to decide the fate of a big Wall Street investment 
bank.   
Yet in all these cases, policy makers may lack political capacity to 
consider the full range of responses until things get worse and the public’s 
perception of the crisis has caught up with theirs. 
III.  CONTAINMENT IN CONTEXT 
Containment rarely gets special mention in the vast economic35 and 
still-limited legal36 literature on financial crises.  As used in this Article—
                                                                                                                          
32 See generally PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET, 
THE IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA (2005); FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN 
ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 182–86 (2006), Brad Setser 
& Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Argentina, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 465 
(2006). 
33 TETT, supra note 4, at 74; NAKASO, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
34 Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and 
Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. (No. 2) 26, 27 (2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
analytical/banking/. 
35 Examples from the economic literature on international financial crises alone are innumerable.  
These range from big-picture overviews using vastly different methodologies, such as CHARLES P. 
KINDLEBERGER, supra note 27 and Kenneth Rogoff & Carmen M. Reinhart, This Time is Different: A 
Panoramic View of Centuries of Financial Crises (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13882) (2008), to works driven by specific crisis episodes, such as NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, 
BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS (2004), SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION 
(Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005), and STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32.  
Other influential contributions include, for example, BARRY EICHENGREEN, ET AL., CRISIS? WHAT 
CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (1995), Paul Krugman, Financing vs. 
Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. ECON. 253 (1988). Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an 
International Lender of the Last Resort (Apr. 20, 1995), available at http://www.earthinstitute. 
columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf.  The economic literature on domestic financial crises is 
even bigger.  There is also a large political economy literature on crisis and response.  See e.g., 
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (Joan 
M. Nelson, ed., 1990).  
36 Apart from the growing literature on sovereign debt (see, e.g., Symposium, Odious Debt: 
Exploring the Outer Limits of Sovereign Debt, N.C. J. INT’L L & COM. REG. 605 (2007); Symposium, 
Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View from the Legal Academy, 53 EMORY L.J. 657 
(2004); Symposium, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177 (2005); Symposium, 
Sovereign Debt, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 637 (2004) for recent examples), which unlike its economist 
counterpart rarely ventures into broader crisis matters, U.S. law scholars have had relatively little to say 
about economic crises, less about financial crises, and less yet about international financial crises.  See 
Daniel W. Levy, A Legal History of Irrational Exuberance, 48 CASE W. RES. 799, 803–04 (1998) 
(observing the dearth of legal literature on economic distress); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermuele, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008 6 
(Univ. Chicago Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 442), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301164 (“Financial crises are less familiar than security crises.”).  
Exceptions from before the current crisis include, for example, Levy, supra (history of judicial 
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to describe resort to extraordinary legal and policy measures to limit 
damage from financial distress—the concept usually appears unnamed in 
the writing on crisis management and regulatory reform.37  When used, the 
term containment usually describes early-phase response to domestic 
banking crises,38 or efforts to stop crises from spreading internationally.39  
Both uses highlight the goal of stemming losses, but stop short of 
elaborating the decision category.  Containment choices in this literature 
are often tinged with mistake and compromise, regrettable exceptions to be 
avoided next time. 
Like the economic and regulatory writing, U.S. law scholarship on 
economic emergency deals with the use of extraordinary measures to 
respond to economic stress, but it does so quite differently.  Emergency is 
not itself a policy category like regulation, but rather the predicate for a 
broad range of responses to different crises.  Authors who write about 
economic emergency tend to concern themselves broadly with crisis 
decision-making rather than economic and financial policy; they often 
operate by analogy to security emergency.40   
This Part examines the relationship between containment and financial 
regulation, and crisis prevention and crisis resolution.  It concludes with a 
brief discussion of containment as emergency response. 
                                                                                                                          
response to financial panics); Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International 
Financial Reform, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2001) (international financial crisis response).  The related 
but distinct category of writing on economic emergency includes CLINTON ROSSITER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 255–64  
(1948, 2002) (on the rise of executive power during the Great Depression), Michael Belknap, The New 
Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67 (1983) (discussing the use of wartime 
powers in economic emergency); William E. Scheuerman, Exception and Emergency Powers: The 
Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869 (May 2000) (discussing Carl Schmitt’s 
theories of executive power in economic emergency), Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional Stretch, Snap-
Back, Sag 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1279 (2005) (comparing doctrinal stickiness of judicial responses to 
security and economic emergencies), and OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NI AIOLAN, LAW IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 76–79 (2006) (on the expansion of wartime 
powers to economic exigency).  Contributions inspired by the ongoing crisis include Posner & 
Vermuele, supra, Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Big 
Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. (2009) (forthcoming), 
(working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1306342).  
37 See, e.g., Morris Goldstein, Making the G-20 Summit Work: The “Ten-Plus-Ten” Plan, 
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/ 
realtime/?p=146 (Oct. 27, 2008) (recommendations for economic recovery/crisis management and 
financial regulatory reform/crisis prevention). 
38 See, e.g., Carl-Johan Lindgren, Pitfalls in Managing Closures of Financial Institutions, in 
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION 76 (Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven 
eds., 2005). 
39 ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 5, 43–44. 
40 For criticisms of the security analogy, see generally, Levy, supra note 36.  Politicians have used 
it strategically beginning in the 20th century; scholars have adopted it as the dominant paradigm of 
emergency decision-making.  See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, First 
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), available at http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-
inaugural/ [hereinafter Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s First Inaugural Address]; see also Belknap, supra 
note 36; Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36. 
 1064 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1051 
A.  Containment and Regulation 
Regulation looks to the future; containment to the present.  The core 
operational difference between the two is in the sequence of priorities.  
Regulation first seeks to change incentives to reduce the risk of failure and 
crisis; mitigating damage from crisis is contingent on the occurrence of a 
crisis despite the regulatory effort.  For containment, the priorities are 
reversed: changing long-term incentives is relevant only if the financial 
system survives the present calamity.41 
Public management of private risk-taking is at the core of financial 
regulation.42  Regulation tries to shape the behavior of firms and 
individuals, for example, to reduce the likelihood of bank failure or 
financial ruin of unsophisticated consumers.43  Another aspect of 
regulation goes to limiting the fallout from risks once they materialize.  For 
example, risk-based capital adequacy requirements work in two ways.  Ex-
ante, they try to discourage excessive risk-taking by making it more costly 
for the regulated firms.  Ex-post, they seek to ensure that each firm has the 
capital cushion to withstand economic shocks.  Containment choices arise 
strictly ex-post and seek immediate results. 
In another example, a regulatory system fraught with moral hazard, 
one that prompts excessive risk-taking, has failed in a central mission.  
Containment policy that arrests financial collapse has met its goal; its 
adverse effects in the long run are for resolution and regulation to mitigate. 
The growing popularity of “macro-prudential” regulation44 adds a twist 
to the relationship between regulation and containment, but does not 
change it.  Macro-prudential regulation is preoccupied with overall 
financial stability, as distinct from the protection of any particular 
                                                                                                                          
41 See, e.g., Mervyn King, Draft Opening Statement for Appearance before the Treasury 
Committee, Turmoil in Financial Markets: What Can Central Banks Do? 7 (Sept. 12, 2007), available 
at http://media.ft.com/cms/a7ed52c2-6111-11dc-bf25-0000779fd2ac.pdf (“[T]here must be strong 
grounds for believing that the absence of ex post insurance would lead to economic costs on a scale 
sufficient to ignore the moral hazard in the future.”).  
42 Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multi-Sectored Financial Services Industry: An 
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 319, 332–36 (1999) [hereinafter Jackson, Regulation]; see also 
HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 6–7 (1999).  Risk management is a central, but not the only driver of regulation.  
Considerations of equity and political economy, as well as historical accident, help shape regulatory 
design, for example, to prevent concentration of political power, or give historically disadvantaged 
groups access to credit.  Jackson, Regulation, supra at 336–39. 
43 Jackson, Regulation, supra note 42, at 332–36. 
44 See generally GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf [hereafter G-30 
REPORT]; U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE (2008) available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf [hereafter 
TREASURY BLUEPRINT]; Ben S. Bernanke, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk, Speech at the 
Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20090310a.htm; Borio, supra note 24. 
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institution or consumer.45  It is regulation geared to minimizing the risk of 
and damage from systemic financial crises.  Unlike conventional (micro-
prudential) regulation, macro-prudential regulation is countercyclical: 
stricter in good times, looser in bad.46  Like containment, it is concerned 
with the scope and transmission of financial shocks.  Unlike containment, 
it seeks to preempt transmission through ex-ante system design.   
The macro-prudential approach shares the essential priorities of 
regulation, namely, the emphasis on changing the incentives and structures 
of the financial system to reduce its vulnerability far into the future.   
Capacity for damage control comes second.  In contrast, the essence of 
containment is ex-post short-term damage control; it operates on existing 
system architecture without aspiring to refashion it. 
B.  Containment and Prevention 
Crisis prevention straddles regulation and containment.  The term is 
widely used in popular, policy, and academic writing to include all 
regulation to bolster financial stability.  In this sense, most regulation—and 
certainly all macro-prudential regulation—is also crisis prevention.  In the 
narrowest sense, prevention is government action at Kindleberger’s 
mystical sweet spot after a shock has killed off the bad firms, but before it 
has dragged down the good ones.47  In his argument, this is the time to 
deploy the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR).  The preceding section 
distinguished containment and regulation, including prevention in the 
broad regulatory sense; this Section distinguishes containment and 
prevention in the narrow sense. 
One way to tease out the difference is by reference to the relationship 
between insolvency and illiquidity.  The classic function of LOLR—
                                                                                                                          
45 This distinction is explicit in Borio, supra note 24; also it is implied in the TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT, supra note 44, and the G-30 REPORT, supra note 44. 
46 Borio, supra note 24, at 197.  Forbearance—suspension of prudential strictures in crisis—is 
commonplace in conventional regulation.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Controlling Systemic Risk in an 
Era of Financial Consolidation in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 61 (2002, 2005).  The recurrent demand for safety 
valves in conventional regulation illustrates the dilemma.  One well-known example is the systemic 
risk exception for bank resolution, created under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991, PL 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.).  Prior to the enactment of FDICIA, FDIC was bound to use the least cost 
method of bank resolution; the systemic risk exception allows the FDIC to bypass it if using the least 
cost method “would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability” and if 
bypassing the least cost method would “avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.”  Id.  For a discussion 
of the exception, see Martin J. Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Remarks at the international 
Association of Deposit Insurers Symposium on Deposit insurance Cross Border Issues (May 3, 2007), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spmay0307.html.  For a 
more recent example, see, for example,  Floyd Norris, Banks Get New Leeway in Valuing Their Assets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at B1 (detailing the Financial Accounting Standards Board's move to relax 
"mark-to-market" accounting requirements for banks in financial crisis). 
47 See supra note 27 and the accompanying text. 
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unlimited short-term lending to banks at high interest on good collateral to 
overcome temporary illiquidity48—seeks to prevent a liquidity shock from 
becoming a solvency crisis.  Illiquidity presumes no fundamental economic 
problem, only a loss of confidence.  Economic losses—along with their 
distribution, and the associated politics—are completely avoidable by 
confidence-boosting liquidity support.  The LOLR also has an explicit role 
ex-ante: confidence in the availability of public liquidity support, even 
without any lending, should deter runs on solvent institutions.  So that 
healthy confidence does not become moral hazard (for example, 
encouraging investment in insolvent firms effectively backed by the 
public), the availability of LOLR support may be restricted subject to 
official discretion,49 and in exchange, may require regulatory oversight.50 
In contrast, containment starts from the presumption of economic loss.  
The deployment of extraordinary measures in containment may “stop the 
bleeding,” but it will not undo the injury.   
A variation on the traditional view of the LOLR emerges from Steven 
Schwarcz’s recent work on systemic risk.  He proposes a market liquidity 
provider of last resort (LPOLR) “to purchase securities in panicked 
markets.”51  Schwarcz frames it as a regulatory proposal for ex-ante risk 
reduction.52  Like the macro-prudentialists, he seeks to reduce risk to the 
financial system broadly defined.53  His proposal would preempt market 
panics and limit damage from them54 through a mix of traditional tools 
such as circuit-breakers, disclosure, leverage caps and activity restrictions, 
along with the LPOLR.55  Like the traditional LOLR, it would help calm 
                                                                                                                          
48 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 57–64 
(1906). 
49 This is commonly referred to as “constructive ambiguity.” 
50 Fred Hirsch, The Bagehot Problem, in Goodhart & Illing, supra note 23, at 187, 193. 
51 Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 8 (Working 
Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102326 [hereinafter, 
Schwarcz, Markets]. 
52 Id. at 8; Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 193, 205 et seq. Schwarcz notes the 
possibility of ad hoc ex post approaches to systemic risk management; these stand in contrast to most 
of the proposal.  Id. at 230–31. 
53 See supra note 45 (works on macro-prudential regulation).  Schwarcz’s perspective has 
antecedents in the legal literature.  For example, Cynthia Lichtenstein described systemic risk as 
encompassing risks presented by securities firms in 1993.  Cf. Lichtenstein, supra note 21, at 141; 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 207, 210–14. 
54 Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 214; “Prevent” is used later in the text.  Id. at 216. 
55 Id. at 225–30.  The distinction between Schwarcz’s proposal and the existing powers of the 
Federal Reserve is relatively fine.  Id. at 213 (distinguishing proposal by characterizing Fed lending as 
limited to banks).  In the Bear Stearns incident, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York used its 
authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to buy assets, including securities, from a 
nonbank using a special purpose vehicle; the same technique was used to support the insurance 
company AIG several months later.  MARKETS GROUP OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW 
YORK, DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2008 25–26 (2009) 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/omo2008.pdf.  Using the same authority, the Federal Reserve 
expanded its facilities to lend to all manner of nonbank institutions against a wide range of illiquid 
assets; the stated goal, as in Schwarcz, is to boost market liquidity.  Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
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markets simply by standing ready to lend or buy assets when panic strikes.   
Like the traditional LOLR, Schwarcz’s proposal addresses illiquidity, not 
insolvency.  The paradigmatic scenario involves no losses at all, since the 
provision of liquidity restores normal market functioning.  This in turn 
makes it possible to frame both LPOLR and LOLR as apolitical: both save 
the system (everyone), neither distributes within it.56 
Containment comes after prevention and preemption have failed to 
bring the markets about; it presumptively entails losses; and it is inherently 
political, if only because it must distribute such losses. 
C.  Containment and Resolution 
Policy, political science and economics writing often combine 
discussion of crisis containment and resolution.  Resolution refers broadly 
to the restructuring and reregulation that happen in the aftermath of 
financial collapse—after panic has abated, but before the economy has 
returned to normal.57  By then, the political system has come to terms with 
the crisis, at least some losses have become apparent, and the actors have 
                                                                                                                          
Understanding the Recent Changes to Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision, http://www. 
newyorkfed.org/markets/Understanding_Fed_Lending.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) Fed. Reserve 
Bank of New York, Commercial Paper Funding Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www. 
newyorkfed.org/markets/cpff_faq_081105.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).  The distinction between 
Schwarcz’s proposal and the general (though not the institution-specific) facilities is that the Fed only 
lends against illiquid assets; technically, it does not buy them except through special-purpose vehicles.  
However, lending and repurchase operations that put the assets on the Fed’s balance sheet for a long 
time can be hard to distinguish from outright purchases.  Section 13(3) allows Federal Reserve banks to 
lend to nonbanks “in unusual and exigent circumstances” with the approval of a supermajority of its 
governors and where credit is unavailable elsewhere.  It was enacted in 1932 as part of a road 
construction bill.  Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, ch 520, § 210, 47 Stat. 715, 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 13(3) (2006)).  President Hoover vetoed that bill’s predecessor, which put 
expansive authority to lend to firms in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, citing recent corruption 
scandals involving former RFC officials.  Text of President’s Message Vetoing the Relief Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 1932, at 2.  Two weeks later, the Fed got expanded authority as a compromise; it 
appears not to have used it between the Great Depression and the current crisis, although it came close 
several times.  See David Fettig, The History of a Powerful Paragraph, The Region, The Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (June 2008), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_ 
papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3485. 
56 Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 19, at 204, 226. 
57 Honohan & Laeven, Introduction and Overview, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 
19, at 11; cf. Joan M. Nelson, Introduction: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Developing 
Nations, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE THIRD 
WORLD 3–4 (Joan M. Nelson ed., 1990):  
The adjustment of individual nations usually comprises two distinct though 
intertwined tasks.  The first is stabilization; that is, reducing balance of payments 
deficits and inflation to levels compatible with resumed and sustainable growth . . . . 
The second aspect of adjustment is structural change designed to encourage foreign 
exchange earning or saving activities, and more generally, to improve incentives and 
efficiency for sustainable growth. 
Containment in this Article is distinct from macroeconomic stabilization.  Governments use 
macroeconomic policy tools much more aggressively in crisis, but the difference from ordinary times is 
one of degree.  In contrast, wholesale restructuring and rewriting contracts is a qualitative departure 
from non-crisis policymaking. 
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begun to look to the future.  The imperative is not to stop the bleeding, but 
to rebuild: 
The goal of resolution policy is to achieve the necessary 
rebuilding of banks’ and borrowers’ balance sheets at the 
lowest cost, where costs include costs from taxpayers’ 
transfers of wealth and the worsening of incentives in the 
financial system.58 
Rebuilding must take account of past mistakes and design a new 
system to avoid them.59  This view of resolution shares a long-term focus 
with regulation.  But because resolution usually operates on a landscape of 
economic and institutional wreckage, it can be both more backward-
looking (for example, compensating crisis victims and mitigating collateral 
damage from containment) and more ambitious (for example, creating new 
institutions and changing regulatory paradigms). 
Containment relates to resolution in two ways: timing and causation.  
Economists usually describe containment and resolution as successive 
stages in managing a banking crisis.  Containment seeks to stop the 
outflow of money, whether in the form of deposit runs or capital flight; 
where applicable, to stabilize the currency; to arrest asset stripping; and to 
limit the collapse of asset prices.60  Containment is a prerequisite to 
resolution, and resolution is its necessary sequel.61  But containment is also 
a source of path dependence: policies adopted “in the heat of the crisis,” 
such as regulatory forbearance, can prove sticky in the resolution phase62 
and can have “potentially irreversible” distribution consequences.63 
Because the writing on crisis resolution tends to be geared to policy 
adoption, and because it is usually embedded in medium and long-term 
policy reform agendas, it produces a particular view of containment.  On 
the one hand, containment is a source of costly, if necessary, departures 
from non-crisis rules,64 where cost is measured both in fiscal terms and in 
terms of compromised incentives.65  On the other hand, it is a window of 
                                                                                                                          
58 Charles W. Calomiris et al., Financial Crisis Policies and Resolution Mechanisms: A 
Taxonomy from Cross-Country Experience in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 19, at 72. 
59 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 37.  
60 Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 6–11; Lindgren et al., supra note 7, at 16–23. 
61 See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 16, at 17 (“No mater what the precise cause of the 
crisis is, getting out of it almost always requires a combination of policy adjustment and emergency 
financing, whether from an official loan or a restructuring of private debts.  Policy adjustment . . . 
[involves] steps to make the country a better long-term credit.”). 
62 Calomiris et al., supra note 58, at 31. 
63 Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 11; see also Lindgren, supra note 38, at 89 (“All [bank 
closure] triggers must be designed to hold up legally, because interventions and closures will destroy 
and redistribute private property and wealth and therefore have a high likelihood of being challenged in 
courts.”). 
64 See generally Lindgren, supra note 38. 
65 Calomiris et al., supra note 58; Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 17; Lindgren et al., supra 
note 7, at 29–45. 
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opportunity to secure far-reaching changes in areas such as corporate 
governance, bankruptcy, and foreign investment:  
It is during the height of the crisis when the pain is felt 
most that there is an opportunity to break established 
malpractices and governance structures, to implement new 
laws and regulations, and to find support for economic and 
financial reforms.66 
In some cases, containment measures might simultaneously promote 
resolution: for example, arresting a market panic may require an indication 
of a near- or even medium-term policy path.  But in the quotation above, 
containment and resolution are joined strategically to achieve a policy 
outcome that is politically impossible when nerves are calmer.  Where the 
outcome is good policy, this may be for the better, but it is not always good 
policy, and the fog of crisis makes it hard to tell. 
D.  Containment and Emergency 
As already noted, contemporary U.S. law scholarship on financial 
crises has been sparse until now, especially when compared with the 
economics, political science, and economic history writing.67  In search of 
a legal perspective on financial crisis containment, I look also to the 
scholarship on economic emergency.   
Emergency response is a qualitatively different category from financial 
regulation, prevention, and resolution.  The last three comprise relatively 
specific objectives and tasks to achieve them—for example, investor 
protection may require suitability rules; preventing a bank run may require 
deposit insurance and a LOLR; managing impaired assets on a large scale 
may require an asset management company.  In contrast, economic 
emergency is a set of conditions, a state of the world claimed as a predicate 
for extraordinary government action.  Each instance of emergency 
response is unique; neither the predicate nor the response may be specified 
ex-ante.  One way of looking at the discussion of containment in this 
Article is as an effort to carve out that part of emergency response whose 
operational content can be described in advance. 
Lawyers have considered financial and economic emergency response 
                                                                                                                          
66 Honohan & Laeven, supra note 19, at 17.  This is a variant of the ubiquitous sentiment against 
“wasting” a crisis, military or economic.  See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Obama’s Fear-Mongering, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/la-oe-goldberg10-
2009mar10,1,7171121.column.  Compare JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 
52 (2003) (describing FDR’s use of popular support for fighting the banking crisis to reshape securities 
regulation). 
67 See supra notes 36, 37 and the accompanying text, and Levy, supra note 36, at 803–04 for a 
similar complaint. 
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occasionally from constitutional theory,68 legal history,69 and comparative70 
perspectives.  Its economic policy content remains largely unexplored in 
the law literature.  Where economists detail a sequence of bank closures, 
capital controls, payment standstills, emergency funding and regulatory 
forbearance—noting all the while that “a clear and transparent legal 
framework” for extraordinary measures is “essential”71—lawyers delegate. 
Part of the reason may be that the literature on economic emergency is 
properly seen as a relatively small part of a much larger literature on 
emergency response, most of which focuses on security.  The central 
question in legal writing is one of authority: who decides whether an 
emergency exists, who decides the content of emergency measures, and 
who or what might shape and cabin such emergency authority.72  Concerns 
about separation of powers and checks and balances loom large.  Financial 
crisis and economic policy specifics serve as background texture for much 
more encompassing discussions about allocation of power.73   
The question of authority is crucial; I will return to it at the end of this 
Article.  For now, I suggest that it is difficult to answer the question “who 
decides” how to respond to a financial crisis without a more granular and 
systematic understanding of what they do74—the subject of the next two 
                                                                                                                          
68 See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 36, 255–64 (2002) (on the rise of executive power during the 
Great Depression), Scheuerman, supra note 36, at 1882–92 (discussing Carl Schmitt’s theories of 
executive power in economic emergency). 
69 See, e.g., Belknap, supra note 36 (arguing for a legal regime for economic emergencies); Levy, 
supra note 36 (examining judicial attitudes to finance through the prism of financial crises). 
70 See, e.g., GROSS & NI AIOLAN, supra note 36, 76–79 (on the expansion of wartime powers to 
economic exigency.  The authors do not purport to address economic emergency comprehensively). 
71 Lindgren, supra note 38, at 101. 
72 This framing is clearest in Schmitt. See also Scheuerman, supra note 36, at 1871–91 
(discussing economic crisis as a catalyst for reevaluation of authority as a means of governance). 
73 See e.g., Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36, 15–16.  The authors describe the Federal 
Reserve’s effective purchase of AIG stock, which they suggest pushed the limits of the Fed’s authority 
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (see supra note 55) in a singular fashion.  They draw 
parallels to Carl Schmitt’s ideas about emergency and the power of the Executive.  AIG was one of a 
species of heavily-lawyered transactions with precedents in the ongoing crisis (Bear Stearns used the 
same special purpose vehicle structure under the same legal authority six months earlier), the crisis 
response of the 1980s (see infra Part V.E, description of the Brady Plan) and the 1990s, to name a few.  
Compare ROBERT E. RUBIN, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO 
WASHINGTON 21-36, 219–23 (2004) (describing the unorthodox use of the U.S. Treasury’s Exchange 
Stabilization Fund to support Mexico in 1995, and the subsequent Congressional restrictions on its use 
during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998). The supermajority and exigency requirements in 
Section 13(3) may have provided more ex-ante procedural protections than the other authorities.  
FDICIA’s systemic risk exception (supra note 46) has a similarly elevated ex-ante threshold. 
74 In a rare law article to integrate a substantive treatment of financial crisis economics with 
theoretical perspectives on authority in a specific institutional setting, Daniel Tarullo suggests that 
some tasks of international financial crisis management may present an intractable challenge for 
allocating authority.  Tarullo, supra note 36, at 613.  Tarullo’s work responding to the financial crises 
of the late 1990s also comes closer than most to addressing the substantive problem of containment.  
He revisits the tradeoff between applying rules-systems and granting discretion to policy makers in an 
international financial crisis, using IMF lending and sovereign bankruptcy as case studies, and 
highlighting the implications of the authority deficit in the international realm.  He argues that some of 
the rules proposals he critiques, if adopted, “may hinder efforts to contain a developing systemic 
 
 2009] FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTAINMENT 1071 
Parts of this Article.  
* * * * * 
In sum, academic and policy approaches to financial crisis 
management present a sporadic view of containment.  For some, it is a 
time-limited stage comprising a sequence of known technical tasks 
designed to stop financial panics—a sequence that requires a firm and 
transparent legal foundation.75  For others, it is the response to a unique, 
unpredictable cataclysm that entails suspending laws and delegating 
power.  In practice, until both officials and their constituents have owned 
up to a crisis, containment measures are conflated with crisis prevention.  
Once the crisis is acknowledged, policy prescriptions mix containment, 
resolution, and regulatory reform.76  Once normalcy returns, containment 
policy often looks like a regrettable aberration.  None of these treatments 
generalize or explain the pattern of containment in recent crises.  The next 
Part is an effort to distil a core set of recurring decisions that comprise 
containment.  It is more general than most policy studies of crisis 
management, but less so than most legal writing on economic emergency.  
The goal is to help situate debates about authority and accountability in a 
financial crisis setting. 
IV.  WHEN RULES DO NOT APPLY: THE CONTENT OF CONTAINMENT 
In his iconic history of financial crises, Kindleberger twice quotes this 
passage from nineteenth-century banker and economist Thomas Joplin: 
“There are times when rules and precedents cannot be broken; others when 
they cannot be adhered to with safety.”77  But as Kindleberger and those 
who followed him have observed, emergency does not unleash chaos.  
Instead, non-crisis rules give way to new habits. 
The following sections explore three kinds of choices that 
policymakers must make once they have determined they are facing a 
financial crisis: whether to invoke wholesale solutions, whether to enforce 
private contracts and government regulations, and how to distribute losses.  
Although they often overlap, these choices address distinct containment 
challenges. 
                                                                                                                          
crisis,” id. at 630.  Although Tarullo is clearly concerned about containment, his focus is not on 
systematically defining the decision category and its implications.  As his article’s title suggests, the 
policy proposals and his critique go more to crisis prevention and reform of the international financial 
system. 
75 Lindgren, supra note 38, at 101.  
76 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 37 (recommendations for economic recovery/crisis 
management and financial regulatory reform/crisis prevention). 
77 KINDLEBERGER, supra note 27, at 13, 197. 
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A.  Blanket or Bespoke 
A severe financial crisis necessarily raises the prospect of a wholesale 
response.  This is most obvious with traditional macroeconomic policy: a 
shock may cause the authorities to raise or lower interest rates, adjust the 
value of the currency (e.g., devaluation), or change the currency regime 
altogether (e.g., dollarization)—measures that by definition target the 
economy as a whole.  It also holds for financial policy: bank holidays, 
exchange controls, deposit freezes and comprehensive guarantees, are 
containment staples.  These have surfaced in economies ranging from 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States to Argentina, Russia 
and South Korea.  Less common across-the-board responses include 
redenominating debt contracts, legislating debt relief, general exchange 
rate subsidies, and injecting capital in the financial sector.  In all cases, 
wholesale financial measures are a departure from non-crisis norms.   
Absent crisis, failure is resolved case-by-case.  Outside bankruptcy, 
contracts are enforced or renegotiated one-by-one.  But even bankruptcy, a 
collective proceeding, coordinates multiple creditors of a single debtor.  
With a judge for every case, a plan for every firm, and a price for every 
asset, bankruptcy overcomes collective action problems among creditors 
that might otherwise race to the courthouse or dismember a viable 
enterprise. 
A large-scale financial crisis adds new constraints: collective action 
problems appear across the economy, affecting both creditors and 
debtors.78  Asset prices collapse; courts and regulators are overwhelmed.  
Such constraints may militate in favor of applying wholesale measures, 
despite their bluntness, to broad categories of debtors and creditors.  Four 
factors drive the choice between wholesale and case-by-case measures in 
containment. 
First, speed is a key objective of containment policy: the goal is to jolt 
the system into reversing course.  A fast-moving crisis, such as a run, does 
not allow time to design and implement solutions tailored to individual 
persons’ or firms’ needs.  Wholesale measures instantly signal that the 
authorities see a system-wide problem, but also their intention to address it 
forcefully and comprehensively.  
Second, a crisis strains administrative capacity.  The capacity 
challenge goes to scale as much as speed.  In a run—or in the case of a 
simultaneous shock such as a currency collapse—the non-crisis resolution 
infrastructure cannot process an avalanche of failures.  This constraint is 
                                                                                                                          
78 See, e.g., Aaron Tornell et al., NAFTA and Mexico’s Less-Than-Stellar Performance 22–23 
(Nat’l Bureau for Econ. Research, Working Paper 10289, 2004) (discussing Mexico’s “cultura de no 
pago” or “culture of non-payment” which followed its recent financial crisis.  With little enforcement 
from Mexican authorities, there was little incentive even for solvent debtors to make good on their 
debts). 
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relative: states with no resources and fragile institutions, such as Haiti, can 
handle fewer cases at once than wealthy ones with established bankruptcy 
and bank resolution systems, such as Sweden.  But no ordinary system can 
handle a 65% insolvency rate.  Wholesale measures can relieve capacity 
constraints through standardization, such as a limited menu of subsidies 
and restructuring formulas, through new institutional arrangements such as 
special courts or asset management companies to take over bad debts, or a 
combination.  In addition, while generalized regulatory forbearance is 
rarely driven by the desire to lighten the load for bureaucrats, it can have 
the side benefit of letting them focus scant resources on containment 
priorities. 
Third, a crisis can make valuation difficult to impossible.  In normal 
times, it makes sense to let the markets value individual contracts and to let 
bankruptcy laws distinguish successful firms from ones that should fail.  
Bankruptcy relies on both a credible threat of liquidation and the existence 
of a plausible liquidation value.  But the threat is not credible, and the 
value meaningless, where over half of all firms are technically insolvent.79  
Extreme currency fluctuation may make it impossible for businesses to 
plan and for markets to value: firms that look viable at Monday’s exchange 
rate may look insolvent on Wednesday, then good again on Friday.  
Complexity—in the form of financial engineering or opaque, convoluted 
ownership structures—can compound the valuation problem.  Replacing a 
large number of individually negotiated contracts with fewer, simpler, 
standardized ones can help the market value them, put a floor under falling 
asset prices, improve liquidity and restore market mechanisms for later 
restructuring. 
Equitable and political considerations supply a fourth reason to choose 
wholesale over case-by-case containment policy.  For example, identical 
treatment for different groups—such as foreign and domestic creditors—
can buy peace with important constituencies.  Alternatively, securing 
political support for crisis response may require wholesale measures that 
discriminate among groups (taxing all CEOs, subsidizing all farmers).  
Wholesale policies often look simple and transparent, but their economic 
effect can diverge from the political signal: identical measures may affect 
different groups differently.  Compensation measures in the resolution 
phase may redistribute containment subsidies.  Defining target groups for 
wholesale measures can have the effect of structuring crisis politics: 
                                                                                                                          
79 Marcus Miller and Joseph Stiglitz put it in terms of bankruptcy’s capacity to convey 
information about the firm’s management and prospects. Where failure is system-wide, bankruptcy is 
uninformative because failing to plan for an 80% devaluation and 100% interest rates is not normally a 
sign of bad management.  Marcus Miller & Joseph Stiglitz, Bankruptcy Protection Against 
Macroeconomic Shocks: The Case for a ‘Super Chapter 11’ 2 (Centre for the Study of Globalisation 
and Regionalisation, 1999), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/keytopic/ 
global/milrstig.pdf. 
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picking winners and losers, reshaping old coalitions. 
Wholesale measures can be mandatory and punitive (for example, 
capital controls) or voluntary and generous (capital infusions).  All share a 
defect: they are by definition over- and under-inclusive.  Wholesale 
measures will always leave worthy victims unhelped and will send scarce 
resources to the undeserving, potentially encouraging others to gamble.  
Such defects only recede against the imperatives outlined earlier—speed, 
administrability, valuation, politics and equity.   
B.  Enforce, Suspend, Rewrite 
Debtors who run out of money typically have three choices: they may 
negotiate with their creditors, default, or file for bankruptcy.  Ordinarily, 
governments enforce private contracts and punish default.  Bankruptcy is a 
standing mechanism for rewriting contracts outside crisis. 
Suspending or rewriting private contracts in crisis addresses different 
problems.  The first reflects a difference of degree, discussed in the 
preceding section: in a general downturn, there may simply be too many 
defaults and insolvencies for the administrative apparatus to handle.  The 
second is a difference in kind.  Even in a crisis, any given debtor and any 
given creditor may be willing and able to carry on in their unamended 
relationship.  However, the performance of some contracts may have 
spillover effects that exacerbate a crisis.80  The presence of externalities 
from performance may prompt government intervention. 
Externalities are particularly apparent where a category of contracts—
or a contract clause that is boilerplate in a given market—poses a 
macroeconomic threat.  For example, an agreement to pay debts in scarce 
hard currency, if it is widespread, can drain reserves.  Pervasive indexation 
of private contracts to foreign currency similarly can put pressure on 
monetary and financial authorities.81  Economists cite other sources of 
contract rigidity, notably pervasive barriers to renegotiation, as a source of 
vulnerability in crisis.82  
To address the first category of threats from private contract language, 
governments may subsidize performance, amend the contracts by law or 
decree, or refuse to enforce them.  For the second category, subsidies are 
not normally an option.  But rewriting contracts is costly: it may make 
future breach too easy (moral hazard), undermine commercial certainty,83 
                                                                                                                          
80 Anna Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts, 82 U.S.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
81 See Guide et al., supra note 14, at 54 (discussing hard currency indexation).  Indexation more 
broadly is a means of risk-allocation; depending on the index, it may favor debtors or creditors. 
82 EICHENGREEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 15-16, 34-36 (on the barriers to renegotiating sovereign 
debt contracts). 
83 See, e.g., Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n. v. Remington Paper & PowerCo., 139 N.E. 470, 
471–72 (N.Y. 1923) (invoking the central importance of commercial certainty in contract law). 
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and diminish faith in the rule of law.  The possibility of government 
intervention to rewrite contracts that had been unobjectionable when made 
also introduces an element of sovereign risk.  As one Argentine 
commentator noted, rewriting contracts often not only undermines the 
institution of contract, but also the credibility of the national legal system.84 
A different but related set of concerns attends regulatory forbearance.  
In normal times, governments enforce their laws and regulations.  In crisis, 
doing so may mean shutting down large portions of the economy and the 
financial system.  One central bank official told this Author that enforcing 
capital adequacy and loan provisioning requirements in crisis would have 
meant taking over the private bankings system.85  Although his description 
may over-dramatize, regulatory forbearance in crisis is ubiquitous.86  It is 
most common with respect to capital adequacy, provisioning, and 
regulatory accounting, which reflects respectively the pervasive capital 
scarcity, bad loans and valuation difficulties that characterize a financial 
crisis. Recognition that strict enforcement of micro-prudential rules can 
severely exacerbate the effects of a crisis animates the design of macro-
prudential regulation. 
Some of the established criticisms of regulatory forbearance echo the 
concerns with rewriting private contracts.  Suspending rules in crisis, 
especially doing so often, makes rules less credible going forward.  It 
penalizes those who comply despite distress, and rewards those who break 
the rules even when they could have complied.  Like other containment 
measures, regulatory forbearance may encourage risky behavior on the 
assumption that rules prohibiting such behavior would not be enforced 
when bets go bad. 
Regulatory forbearance also raises distinct concerns from suspending 
contract enforcement.  First, it is hard to stop.  Regulated entities develop a 
vested interest in forbearance, and lobby hard to keep it going: it becomes 
part of the business model.  Perhaps more importantly, early forbearance 
makes it possible for public and private actors to delay recognition of the 
crisis, while prolonged forbearance makes it possible to delay 
restructuring.  Put differently, forbearance can work both as a crisis 
response measure and as a means of denial.  In the first instance, it creates 
a breathing space for other response measures.  In the second, it serves as 
cover for channeling scarce resources to the regulated entities and their 
creditors.  The difference between the two uses of forbearance is often hard 
to tell and politically determined. 
                                                                                                                          
84 Spector, supra note 11, at 129.  
85 Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Trip Report: Argentina, August 4–9, at 7 (Nov. 3, 2003) (Council 
on Foreign Relations) (unpublished paper on file with author). 
86 Lindgren, supra note 38, at 89–92. 
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C.  Distribution 
In September 2007, days before he had to rescue Northern Rock and 
guarantee the liabilities of the British banking system, Bank of England 
Governor Mervyn King criticized other central banks for injecting money 
into the market.  He framed his criticism in terms of creditor moral hazard, 
and warned that central bank actions could encourage creditors to gamble 
in the expectation of being bailed out.87  Shortly thereafter, the Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee argued that the U.S. Treasury’s limited 
and voluntary mortgage modification initiative was sowing moral hazard 
among irresponsible debtors.88  This illustrates another containment 
perennial: when doing nothing is not an option, policy makers trying to 
contain a crisis must effectively decide whose moral hazard is worse—
from the start, they engage in distribution. 
Debt restructuring and “bailouts” both distribute.  Losses from 
financial distress first fall on debtors and creditors.  Debt reduction 
mandates take away from creditors and give to debtors.  Government-
funded rescue operations shift loss from both debtors and creditors to the 
taxpayers.  Creditors can be some combination of bank depositors, bank 
owners, and government-backed deposit insurance agencies.  Where debt 
takes the form of a marketable security (whether it started out that way or 
was repackaged through securitization), creditors can be local pension 
funds with long time horizons, foreign municipalities that count on the 
income to maintain vital services, Italian retirees, Connecticut hedge funds, 
or Wall Street investment banks.  Similarly, debtors can be poor 
homeowners or wealthy corporations.  Each crisis will have its own 
                                                                                                                          
87 See, e.g., Carol Douherty, British Central Bank Critical of Cash Infusions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2007; Mervyn King, Turmoil in Financial Markets: What Can Central Banks Do? 7 (Draft 
Opening Statement for Appearance before the Treasury Comm., Sept. 12, 2007), available at 
http://media.ft.com/cms/a7ed52c2-6111-11dc-bf25-0000779fd2ac.pdf: 
But, on the other hand, the provision of such liquidity support undermines the 
efficient pricing of risk by providing ex post insurance for risky behaviour.  That 
encourages excessive risk-taking, and sows the seeds of a future financial crisis.  So 
central banks cannot sensibly entertain such operations merely to restore the status quo 
ante.  Rather, there must be strong grounds for believing that the absence of ex post 
insurance would lead to economic costs on a scale sufficient to ignore the moral hazard in 
the future.  In this event, such operations would seek to ensure that the financial system 
continues to function effectively. 
Id. 
88 Statement of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee on Treasury Department’s Mortgage 
Foreclosure Program 2 (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20071210_ 
ShadowStatement250.pdf: 
The interest-rate freeze appears to reward borrowers who made bad decisions . . . 
Additional problems of fairness and moral hazard are raised by wholesale adjustment of 
investor and lender claims to interest-rate income under pre-existing mortgage contracts. 
Rewriting mortgage contracts without open negotiations between servicers and investors 
promises to discourage future investors from participating in markets for securitized 
loans. 
Id. 
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constellation of constituents. 
Distribution is politically, and often legally, fraught.  It requires 
officials to choose among constituents, many of whom wear multiple hats 
at once: homeowners, depositors, retirees, shareholders, and investment 
bankers, to name a few.  It may require imposing new taxes, breaking 
contracts and taking property.   
In contrast, framing crisis response decisions in terms of loss limitation 
puts decision makers above the political fray.  This can be done in two 
ways.  First, if the crisis is one of temporary illiquidity, there should be no 
losses and no need to spread the pain.  As noted earlier, the LOLR 
advances funds to solvent institutions and expects to be repaid forthwith.89  
Second, even in a solvency crisis that entails losses, supporting some 
constituents over others may help limit overall social cost.  In this view, 
banks and households are vehicles, not objects of intervention.90  A bank 
looks like a better vehicle than a household, because a bank failure can 
bring down many firms and households.  Helping banks helps everyone at 
once and no one in particular.  
Where the problem is insolvency, masking distribution in these ways 
can be costly.  First, it may delay recognition of a crisis and crisis 
response, which can magnify aggregate losses.  Second, it may reduce 
accountability.  The liquidity-solvency paradigm reinforces the view that 
financial crisis containment decisions, while urgent and complex, are 
essentially technical: it creates the illusion of a hard boundary accessible 
with scientific precision.  But judgments about liquidity and solvency are 
often wrong or fudged, and virtually always contested and political.91  If a 
crisis is mislabeled, the public may be stuck with losses from failed 
liquidity support where other distribution options might have been chosen 
up front. 
Third, once the decision is made to shift some losses to the public, 
choices about who gets scarce rescue resources and who is left to fail 
require legitimacy in their own right.  This is so even when such choices—
like triage in battlefield medicine—are easy to justify as limiting aggregate 
                                                                                                                          
89 BAGEHOT, supra note 48, at 57–64. 
90 RUBIN, supra note 73, at 19: 
I tried to explain that I wouldn’t spend a nickel of taxpayer money for the sake of 
rescuing investors.  Again and again, I returned to my arguments that our proposal to 
help Mexico was driven by our national interest.  These numbers are always hard to 
calculate, but we made a rough judgment about the potential costs of a prolonged 
Mexican crisis to the United States—700,000 jobs affected, a 30 percent increase in 
illegal immigration, and so on. 
Id. 
91 See Goodhart & Illing, supra note 23, at 13, 16 (summarizing contributions on the subject), and 
infra Part II.B. 
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losses.92  They are not always easy to justify; and measures that are 
perceived as illegitimate may ultimately fail for lack of political support. 
* * * * * 
The description of containment so far raises a number of questions for 
crisis response.  I collect these here before proceeding to the case studies in 
Part V.  First, if the decisions about wholesale measures, enforcing 
contracts and regulations, and loss distribution are inevitable, how should 
policy makers go about making them?  What factors should they consider 
in each case?  What legal and institutional features might make for better, 
or at least for easier, containment decisions?  Second, how should the law 
allocate authority over containment policy?  What should be the respective 
roles of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches—but also of 
independent agencies, most importantly central banks, and foreign actors, 
public and private?  Third, does isolating containment as a category help 
determine the timing of emergency response?  The accounts below suggest 
some partial answers. 
V.  CONTAINMENT IN PRACTICE 
This Part examines how the three kinds of crisis containment decisions 
have played out in very different economic and political settings: Indonesia 
in 1997–1998, Japan in 1994–1998, the United States in 1933, Argentina in 
2001–2002, and Mexico in 1982.  All five examples involved bad loans 
and widespread distress in the banking sector.  But the five crises had 
different causes and developed in different ways.  In Mexico and 
Argentina, government debt was a key source of distress.  In the United 
States, government debt was involved, but it was not central to the crisis.  
In Japan and Indonesia, financial stress was most severe in the corporate 
and banking sectors.  Mexico offered an odd twist: its government debt 
problems also threatened the banking sector in the United States.  A period 
of falling real estate prices was key to Japan’s collapse; fast-moving 
currency crises defined Argentina’s and Indonesia’s.  For all the 
differences, governments in each case faced the containment decisions 
described in Part IV, even though not all were acknowledged as such.  Yet 
each government’s choices reflected a specific institutional and political 
context. 
A.  Indonesia 1997-1998 
Between July 1997 and January 1998, Indonesia’s currency, the 
                                                                                                                          
92 Medical triage involves dividing the injured into three groups to conserve scarce rescue 
resources:  priority goes to the borderline cases that might survive with treatment, but would perish 
without it.  The lightly and terminally injured alike must wait. 
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rupiah, fell by over 75% as international investors fled Asia.93  In less than 
a year, the financial crisis would end President Suharto’s thirty-two year 
dictatorship.  At the height of the crisis, 80% of all Indonesian firms were 
illiquid and 65% were technically insolvent, unable to repay foreign-
currency debts.94  At least three-quarters of all bank loans were 
nonperforming.95 
Still reeling from having to rescue Korean banks,96 some international 
officials had a radical idea: why not swap all corporate debt in Indonesia 
into equity overnight?  This would achieve a conventional bankruptcy 
result—handing insolvent firms over to their creditors—without getting 
bogged down in Indonesia’s notoriously ineffectual bankruptcy system, 
and might just work fast enough to arrest the downward slide.  Even by 
crisis standards, the blanket swap was an extreme idea; it was promptly 
rejected after a few policy brainstorms. 
Under another proposal, later described in a theoretical paper by 
Marcus Miller and Joseph Stiglitz, Indonesia’s currency collapse would 
have triggered across-the-board corporate debt reduction.97  In Miller and 
Stiglitz’s “Super Chapter 11,” general debt relief is appropriate in response 
to macroeconomic shock because individual managers are not to blame for 
pervasive insolvency, and because the skills of the existing managerial 
cadre are essential to rehabilitate the corporate sector. 
The instant swap and Super Chapter 11 came from very different 
diagnoses of the crisis, and, if implemented, would have led to polar 
opposite outcomes: a swap would expropriate, while debt relief would 
entrench, the existing owners.  But both proposals contemplated the 
restructuring of private contracts on an economy-wide scale.  In 1997–
1998, such blanket measures seemed sensible considering the rapid spread 
                                                                                                                          
93 INT’L MONETARY FUND, INDONESIA: STATISTICAL APPENDIX 42 tbl.39 (May 1999), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/1999/cr9939.pdf.  See generally Barry Eichengreen, The 
Asian Crisis After Ten Years, Keynote Address at Singapore Centre for Applied and Policy Economics 
at Singapore National University 5 (July 31, 2008), available at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/ 
~eichengr/sing_keynote.pdf; Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The East Asian Financial Crisis: 
Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1–2 (1998) (attributing the 
crisis in part to investor behavior). 
94 The exchange rate plunge quadrupled the rupiah value of their dollar debt.  Conservative 
estimates of private sector debt topped $72 billion, over 70% of Indonesia’s GDP.  LEONARDO 
MARTINEZ-DIAZ, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 226 n.42 (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author); 
RICHARD ROBISON & VEDI R. HADIZ, REORGANIZING POWER IN INDONESIA: THE POLITICS OF 
OLIGARCHY IN AN AGE OF MARKETS 153 (2004); Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Concludes Article IV 
Consultation with Indonesia, 1999 PUB. INFO. NOTICE NO. 99/33. 
95 ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94 at 154. 
96 See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing the Korean government’s guarantee of 
Korean bank liabilities). 
97 Miller & Stiglitz, supra note 79.  See also JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 57–64 (2002); Joseph Stiglitz, The Insider, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2000, at 56, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWRPB File.  At the time of the proposal, Stiglitz was Chief 
Economist of the World Bank. 
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of Indonesia’s crisis and the wild currency fluctuations, which made 
valuation nearly impossible.  Institutional factors, such as the complex web 
of corporate conglomerates, corrupt courts and an unused bankruptcy law 
from Dutch colonial days compounded the containment challenge. 
These elements, which argued in favor of an expansive wholesale 
response, weighed against powerful countervailing considerations.  When 
the crisis hit, fifteen families, all but one of Chinese descent, controlled 
over 60% of the stock market capitalization.  Suharto’s family controlled 
nearly 17%.98  These were the principal debtors whose unhedged foreign 
borrowing made the country so vulnerable.  With such extreme 
concentrations of ownership and debt, a wholesale debt-equity swap would 
have expropriated the ethnic Chinese elite on a revolutionary scale, most 
likely in favor of foreign investors.  On the other hand, across-the-board 
debt forgiveness under “Super Chapter 11” would have visibly rescued the 
same ethnic elites facing a backlash from the native Indonesian majority.99 
Similar distribution concerns were present, albeit less stark, in more 
conventional containment policy options mooted in Indonesia.  For 
example, some had suggested imposing general restrictions on capital 
outflows.  These were unacceptable to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), whose views came with billions of dollars in emergency lending, 
but also to the elites rushing to get money out of Indonesia.100  Blanket 
deposit guarantees similarly faced resistance as bank runs spread in the fall 
of 1997.  Indonesian technocrats and IMF officials opposed such 
guarantees for fear of moral hazard, but also because they did not want to 
appear to reward the elites whose banks had been funneling dubious loans 
to connected firms.101 
Absent good distribution options, officials lapsed into policy paralysis 
and incrementalism.  In October of 1997, the government agreed with the 
IMF to shut down sixteen out of over 200 banks, and to extend a partial 
guarantee to small deposits.  Designed to include banks owned by 
Suharto’s family and associates, the narrowly targeted closing was meant 
to signal both the government’s seriousness and the discreet nature of the 
crisis.102  It backfired badly: Suharto’s son got his bank back within days of 
                                                                                                                          
98 STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL. EAST ASIAN CORPORATIONS: HEROES OR VILLAINS? 13–14, tbl.8 
(1999); Hugh Patrick, Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Financial Crisis: Experience of 
East Asian Countries 16 (Dec. 11, 2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with Columbia Business 
School), www.kdic.or.kr/english/down/2001_I_2(Session1).doc. 
99 Similar concerns surfaced in connection with a proposal to establish a currency board, fixing 
the value of the rupiah: international officials suspected among other things that Suharto and his cronies 
would set the value artificially low and spirit the remaining dollars out of the country.  BLUSTEIN, 
supra note 6, at 225. 
100 BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 85–115. 
101 This also reflected residual hope that the crisis was not entirely systemic, and that confidence 
could return with closing the right subset of bad banks.  Id. at 111.  For further information regarding 
connected lending, see MARTINEZ-DIAZ, supra note 94, at 190. 
102 See Lindgren et al., supra note 7, at 2. 
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closing; confusing announcements suggested (correctly) that more banks 
were at risk; and the partial guarantee did nothing for large depositors who 
made up most of the deposit base by value.103 
In the interim, central bank lending continued in force.  Like the 
rejected options, this ostensible liquidity support had the effect of bailing 
out the best-connected.  For the government it may have had the added 
virtues of being discretionary and less obvious to the public eye than 
blanket guarantees or moratoria.  Better yet, the authorities’ heavy reliance 
on central bank lending allowed everyone to avoid admitting that Indonesia 
was in the middle of a nasty solvency crisis.  A few months later, when the 
grim reality settled in, the state issued a full guarantee of all bank 
liabilities.  By then, the capital had decamped for Singapore.104 
The next round of measures, launched in January 1998 along with the 
guarantee, tried to straddle containment and resolution.  Coming at the 
lowest point in rupiah’s slide, it aimed to arrest it—but not at the cost of 
bailing out the undeserving.  The centerpiece of the emergency package 
was an asset management company, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency (IBRA).  The agency’s mission was all-encompassing: taking over 
bad banks, restructuring and selling their assets, and recovering as much as 
possible of the central bank liquidity support dispensed in the preceding 
months.  Meant to boost market confidence, IBRA took months to sort out 
its mandate, management, and authority, all in the public eye.  It then 
embarked on a multi-step process of taking over and culling banks, 
assuming portfolios, and negotiating individual restructuring arrangements.  
Initially, it had no authority to reduce debt or foreclose on collateral.  
IBRA eventually came to control assets worth over one-third the size of 
Indonesia’s economy.  In its capacity as “the chief arbiter of . . . a massive 
redistribution of corporate assets,” IBRA became a major political force in 
its own right.105 
A year into the crisis, bank resolution costs stood at 51% of 
Indonesia’s GDP106 and much of the economy was in state hands.  With 
Suharto out of power and many of his associates out of sight, asset sales 
remained mired in political controversy.107  The new government rejected 
                                                                                                                          
103 BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 112; see also ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94, at 156 (noting that 
Suharto expected the announcement of the IMF to restore confidence in the financial system, which it 
ultimately did not). 
104 INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, INT’L MONETARY FUND, EVALUATION REPORT: THE IMF AND 
RECENT CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES 13–15 (2003) available at http://www.imf-
ieo.org/eval/complete/pdf/07282003/all.pdf [hereinafter EVALUATION REPORT]. 
105 See ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94 at 197 (noting that by mid-1999, the IBRA controlled 
assets amounting to 546 trillion rupiah); Wayne Arnold, Indonesian Bank Agency Fading Out, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at W3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting that the IBRA 
recouped 146 trillion rupiah of the 650 trillion spent on rebuilding the Indonesian banking system).  
106 See Lindgren et al., supra note 7, at 165. 
107 Arnold, supra note 105 (noting that the IBRA was viewed as an agency that would reform the 
banking system following Suharto’s exit from power). 
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demands to hand over IBRA’s holdings to native Indonesians, but also 
barred sales to the old, mostly Chinese, owners.  Western investors 
remained unpopular; however, the state’s dire fiscal predicament prompted 
further opening to foreign capital, notably in the banking sector.  It took 
years and much maneuvering to bring a mix of old and new capital back to 
Indonesia,108 with the state absorbing losses many times the size of the 
original corporate liabilities. 
It is customary to blame Indonesia’s crisis response on the dysfunction 
of a dying dictatorship and the dogmatism of international officials.109  
Both are likely at fault.  But Indonesia’s choices, while extreme, are not 
unique.  Politicians and technocrats everywhere recoil at drastic wholesale 
response to crisis, then come to embrace it after costly bespoke measures 
fail to stop the collapse.  Politicians hate to admit to large-scale failure; 
technocrats resent the moral hazard and inequity inherent in across-the-
board response.  And few policy makers have the stomach to preside over 
revolutionary redistribution. 
Indonesia’s case was notable in yet another respect.  From the start, 
even before the government had acknowledged the full depth and breadth 
of the crisis, domestic and international policy makers saw distress as an 
opportunity to secure far-reaching structural reforms of the Indonesian 
economy.  While the dynamic itself is quite common, the depth of 
Indonesia’s crisis and the breadth of the reform ambition were impressive.  
IMF and World Bank lending conditions, many developed with the quiet 
support of technocrats within the Indonesian government,110 among other 
things sought to break up industrial and trading monopolies, privatize state 
enterprises, open the financial sector to foreign participation, revamp the 
bankruptcy regime and clean up the courts.  Although the reform agenda 
might have been reasonable as a matter of economic policy, in retrospect, it 
is harder to justify as crisis management.  Foreign and domestic actors 
were quite open about their desire to use the crisis as a window of policy 
opportunity, and they were right—perhaps to a greater degree than anyone 
had expected.111  Yet the muscular push for reforms, some of which had 
less-than-obvious payoff in arresting the crisis, cost domestic and 
                                                                                                                          
108 See ROBISON & HADIZ, supra note 94, at 191–92 (noting that while IBRA was established in 
1997 to work toward recapitalizing Indonesian banks, by 2001 Indonesian banks were still struggling); 
see also Patrick, supra note 98, at 16 (noting that violence in Indonesia in 1998 contributed to the flight 
of Indonesian capital).  
109 BLUSTEIN, supra note 6, at 110–11; EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 104, at 13–15; Radelet 
& Sachs, supra note 93, at 1; Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 56. 
110 MARTINEZ-DIAZ, supra note 94, at 195. 
111 Id. at 218 (describing President Habibie’s reluctant embrace of IMF program conditionality, 
including trade openness, as a way out of the crisis even as it was contrary to his own nationalist 
preferences).  The most extreme “reform” was political—the end of Suharto’s dictatorship.  Although 
many saw the crisis and the ensuing reform conditionality as part of a Western plot to overthrow the 
President, such charges remain the province of conspiracy theories. 
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international policy makers enormous political capital. 
Indonesia offers one of the starkest illustrations of containment 
decision-making and its extreme distributional consequences.  Perhaps 
because the distribution stakes were so high, the default option—avoiding 
wholesale restructuring for as long as possible, quietly supporting 
entrenched interests with forbearance and central bank lending, all the 
while shifting losses onto the general public—carried the day. 
B.  Japan 1994–1998 
Japanese banks were among the largest creditors to bankrupt 
Indonesian companies.  Apart from that, the two crises had little in 
common.  Indonesia was poor; Japan was rich.  Indonesia had deep ethnic 
divisions compounded by extreme inequality; Japan had some of the 
lowest levels of wealth and income inequality in the industrial world.112  
Indonesia was an oligarchic dictatorship; Japan a democracy, albeit one 
where a single party had dominated the political scene for decades.  
Indonesia suffered a sudden currency collapse; Japan’s economy unraveled 
over a decade.  Unlike Indonesia, Japan had ample financial, technical and 
institutional capacity.  Yet the two governments made some similar 
decisions about crisis containment.  Through most of Japan’s “lost 
decade,” its authorities approached institutional failure case-by-case, 
practiced regulatory forbearance, and insisted on scrupulous performance 
of private contracts.  Perversely, this approach resulted in a wholesale 
rescue of the financial system, and at least in the first instance, a large-
scale loss transfer from banks and their borrowers to the public. 
Japan entered the 1990s with a burst real estate bubble and a stock 
market that had dropped over half its value.  The height of the bubble in 
the late 1980s coincided with capital markets deregulation, which made it 
easier for the largest Japanese manufacturing firms to issue securities, and 
sent Japanese banks to scramble for new borrowers.  Loans to small and 
medium-size firms, to real estate and finance companies, and to 
individuals, grew rapidly.113  A large portion of these loans was directly 
and indirectly secured by real estate.  Historically, real estate had been the 
dominant form of collateral for bank lending in Japan.  As a result, many 
loans went bad when land prices fell by more than two-thirds at the turn of 
the decade.114  But the damage was hidden, as the government encouraged 
                                                                                                                          
112 See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and 
International Perspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 204 (2006) (describing the far lower levels of 
wealth and income inequality in post-war Japan than in the United States). 
113 Yoshinori Shimizu, Convoy Regulation, Bank Management, and the Financial Crisis in Japan, 
in JAPAN’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO U.S. EXPERIENCE 57, 61–71 (Ryoichi Mikitani & 
Adam S. Posen eds., 2000).  
114 Id. at 60, 64, 70–71, 74.  Banks also indirectly backed long-term capital market financing.  
Most bank and capital market financing was effectively secured.  Id. 
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banks to recycle the loans and paper over losses while waiting for a 
recovery that did not come.115 
Commentators often date the start of the financial crisis to 1994 and 
the near-failure of two urban credit cooperatives.  Contrary to crisis 
stereotype of falling giants, Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen were small deposit-
taking institutions of the sort that lent locally to families and small 
businesses.116  Bad real estate loans put the two in such bad shape that even 
their notoriously lax municipal regulators recommended shutting them 
down.  Instead, they were rescued with financial support from other banks 
and contributions from the local and national governments.  This was the 
first time since World War II that Japan used public funds to bail out a 
financial institution, and the first in a series of ad-hoc rescues that soon 
covered the entire financial system. 
Over the next four years, failures spread to housing lenders, banks big 
and small, and global securities houses.  In November 1997, nearly every 
week brought news of financial collapse—including the bankruptcy of 
Yamaichi Securities that began this Article.117  The inflection point came in 
1998 with the failure of Long Term Credit Bank (LTCB) once the ninth 
largest in the world by asset size,118 followed by a spate of more 
comprehensive legislation, including an asset management scheme in 
1999. 
The government’s response between 1994 and 1998—continued 
regulatory forbearance, central bank liquidity support and “voluntary” 
contributions from solvent banks to meet the contractual obligations of the 
failing—signaled that the troubles were limited and temporary, even as 
many policy makers knew they were not.  Each failure exposed new gaps 
in the resolution infrastructure and each rescue package appeared to be 
jimmy-rigged to make up for these gaps.  After a while some of the 
features, such as the private bank contributions—or hougachou (a term 
also used to describe village collections for religious feasts)119—became 
fixtures of Japan’s crisis response.  Fiscal contributions remained 
immensely controversial.  As a result, last-resort lending during that period 
turned conventional central banking principles upside down: one finance 
ministry official observed in retrospect that most Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
support went to failed institutions, not temporarily illiquid ones.120 
                                                                                                                          
115 Id. at 77. 
116 NAKASO, supra note 5, at 4; TETT, supra note 4, at 72; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Bank Failures in Mature Economies, 13 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 7 (2004), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp13.pdf?noframes=1. 
117 NAKASO, supra note 5, at 8. 
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note 5, at 12. 
119 NAKASO, supra note 5, at 5. 
120 Id. at 22. 
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Just before the rescue of the credit cooperatives in 1994, the Central 
Bank Governor had assured the public that BOJ funds would not be used to 
bail out failed firms, but only to maintain financial stability.121  In practice, 
the government appears to have seen the latter as a function of the former: 
any failure was a threat to stability.  Often-cited institutional factors 
provide only part of the explanation. 
Japanese banks and their customers had been linked for decades, some 
longer, in an elaborate pattern of cross-shareholding.122  By some counts, 
over half of all public companies’ shares could be found in the hands of 
their banks, their customers, and related firms; a relatively small 
percentage of all shares traded publicly in practice.123  Although ownership 
links were common in the corporate sector and not limited to public 
companies, they were especially strong among financial firms: in the early 
1990s, banks’ largest equity holdings were overwhelmingly in other 
financial institutions.124 
The avowed purpose of cross-shareholding was to foster stability.  
Stability in turn had several dimensions.  First, it could be a vehicle for 
promoting financial stability through access to credit, a form of mutual 
assistance.  Second, it was justified as a way of warding off hostile 
takeovers.  Third, cross-shareholding was a means of commitment: it 
fostered long-term business dealings and reinforced existing contractual 
links, for example, between suppliers and their customers, or banks and 
their borrowers.125 
The functions and efficacy of cross-shareholding and other linkages 
                                                                                                                          
121 Id. at 5. 
122 For a more in-depth discussion of Japanese cross-shareholding, see generally J. Mark 
Ramseyer, Cross Shareholding in the Japanese Keiretsu (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for 
Law, Econ. and Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 244, 1998), available at 
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ST/ESA/1999/DP.15 (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter DESA Discussion Paper] (prepared by Mark Scher), 
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cross-shareholding involving Japan’s commercial banks, and the problems accompanying the practice).  
Cross-shareholding has roots in the history of Japanese corporate organization; however, it evolved and 
adapted in response to legal reform and foreign investment after World War II.  See, e.g., Scher, supra, 
at 4–5 (explaining the evolution of cross-shareholding from World War II  through the 1990s). 
123 See DESA Discussion Paper, supra note 122, at 1–2 (citing 65–70% as the level of “quiescent 
stable shareholding” in publicly traded firms).  Hugh Patrick cites a lower percentage than Scher, but 
still above 50% for financial firms in the 1980s and 1990s.  Patrick, supra note 98, at 10–12. 
124 Patrick, supra note 98, at 11; DESA Discussion Paper, supra note 122, at 15 (“Fifteen out of 
the top sixteen companies in which city, regional and long-term credit banks held shares were in fact 
other financial institutions . . . .”). 
125 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 96–99, 318–19 (Alan Bird, 
ed., 2001) (defining and explaining “cross-shareholdings” and “mochiai”); Japan Economic Planning 
Agency, White Paper: Economic Survey of Japan, (1991–1992) 180–81 (1992); see also Ramseyer, 
supra note 122, at 16–17, 19–20 (discussing cross-shareholding in supplier relationships). 
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among Japanese firms are debated in a large literature.126  For purposes of 
this case study, cross-shareholding is interesting as a variant of 
interconnectedness that affects crisis management in many countries.  In 
Japan, the practice of cross-shareholding, along with the financial and 
other business relationships it sought to bolster, appeared to make it more 
difficult for the system to countenance individual failure, to encourage 
continued lending to weak firms,127 and to make financial institutions 
generally more prone to peer and government pressure to maintain 
confidence.128  Cross-shareholding was far from the only means of 
interconnectedness or the most important barrier to individual failure in 
Japan, yet it offers an especially stark illustration of the predicament.   
The commitment device seemed to work as designed.  Quite apart 
from any “soft” rescue norm, the “hard” contractual and ownership links 
helped transmit individual failure far and wide.129  Private sector 
executives described themselves as bound by a public duty to maintain 
confidence in the face of cascading bad news.  Thus the head of LTCB 
explained his decision to pay dividends while the bank was insolvent as a 
matter of protecting the system.  If he failed to pay, he would be 
responsible for bringing down other banks, firms and perhaps the economy 
as a whole.130  But even where failure could not be avoided—as in the 
Yamaichi bankruptcy and the ultimate nationalization and sale of LTCB—
the government scrupulously paid up on the firms’ contracts, for fear that 
interconnectedness would bring down others and further disrupt the 
markets.131 
                                                                                                                          
126 See, e.g., Masahiro Aoki et al., The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview, in 
THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING 
ECONOMIES (Masahiro Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., 1994); Ronald J. Gilson &  Mark J. Roe, 
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Japanese keiretsu); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and 
Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 401, 403–04 (2002) [hereinafter The 
Myth of the Main Bank] (discussing the role of the “main bank” in Japanese keiretsu groups); Yoshiro 
Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter?  The Myth of the Japanese Main Bank, 
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(arguing that the main bank “insurance” function is a fiction); see also DESA Discussion Paper, supra 
note 122, at 10 (citing to interviews with Japanese bankers).  
127 Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Crisis Resolution and Credit Allocation: The Case of Japan, in 
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES 305 (Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005). 
128 Patrick writes more broadly about the challenge of overcoming “embedded relationships” in 
crisis.  Patrick, supra note 98, at 22–24; see generally NAKASO, supra note 5; TETT, supra note 4 
(citing examples of contractual and ownership links between LTCB and real estate clients as crisis 
transmission mechanisms and policy constraints). 
129 TETT, supra note 4, at 59, 87, 105; Patrick, supra note 98, at 22–24 (discussing “embedded 
relationships).  It seems fitting that the bookends of Japan’s slow-motion financial collapse—the failure 
of two credit cooperatives in 1994 and of LTCB in 1998—were connected.  LTCB had an undisclosed 
equity stake in Tokyo Kyowa; all three also shared a big client, a real estate company that ultimately 
destroyed them all.  TETT, supra note 4, at 72–73. 
130 TETT, supra note 4, at 112. 
131 NAKASO, supra note 5, at 12–13. 
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In the background, forbearance permeated the regulatory fabric.  
Senior officials expected to assume high posts with commercial banks 
upon retiring from public service.132  Leading up to the crisis, financial 
sector and official actors understood the prevailing “convoy regulation” 
system as a way for the government to ensure the survival of even the 
weakest banks; the banks in turn accommodated government lending 
priorities.133  In crisis, the government supported “flexible” accounting and 
coordinated “voluntary” rescues among regulated institutions.   
In sum, Japan was in a peculiar position of resisting comprehensive 
crisis response where single-firm failure was seen as a threat to the system 
in financial and political terms.  This resulted in ad-hoc, case-by-case 
rescues that added up to a wholesale bailout of the financial sector.  Those 
that borrowed from Japanese banks at the height of the real estate bubble—
small and midsize firms that did not have access to the capital markets, real 
estate and financial firms, and some individual borrowers134—appeared to 
benefit disproportionately from the infusion of government money. 
In Japan, as in many other crisis countries, banks were poorly 
capitalized and underprovisioned; the deposit insurance and investor 
protection funds were small and broke; and until 1998, the government had 
limited power to take over and restructure failed institutions.  
Interconnectedness and mutual assurance were presented, for a time, as an 
effective substitute for capital cushions and public insurance.  But just as 
the most generous capital cushions and insurance schemes prove 
inadequate in a severe crisis, mutual assurance—if it ever worked135—fails 
when everyone is under water.  It can also constrain crisis response: when 
offered public recapitalization funds in early 1998, “all major banks . . . 
applied for capital injection in order to avoid the risk of being singled out 
as a weak bank,”136 spreading thin the already limited support.  What might 
have been narrowly targeted measures became wholesale. 
Japanese authorities are routinely accused of dawdling for a decade; 
the social and political context gets blamed for slowing and muting the 
crisis response.  But viewed from another angle, Japan had a predictable 
reaction to an ordinary predicament.  For as long as officials believed that 
there was nothing they could do about the crisis, they had no reason to 
                                                                                                                          
132 The practice was called “descent from heaven.”  Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Monetary & 
Exchange Affairs Dep’t, Working Paper: The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources and 
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136 NAKASO, supra note 5, at 12. 
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acknowledge its true magnitude.137  They resorted to regulatory 
forbearance and measures meant to avoid losses, such as central bank 
liquidity support and mutual assistance among banks.  As more firms 
teetered on the brink, the government adopted by default a policy of 
rescuing everyone, and paid failed institutions to perform under financial 
contracts that would have been breached without government help.  This 
increased the total magnitude of financial sector losses and progressively 
shifted them onto the general public.  More radical measures had to wait 
for the political system to adjust to the magnitude of the crisis, which took 
more and bigger failures and failed rescues. 
C.  United States 1933 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office more than three years after the 
stock market crash, when the economy had shrunken by half, five thousand 
banks had failed, states and companies printed scrip, and Mexican money 
circulated in the United States.138  In some industrial cities, over 70% of all 
workers were unemployed.  Farmers with pitchforks stormed courthouses 
to block foreclosures.  Lloyd’s of London sold riot insurance in 
America.139  Crisis denial was not an option. 
Despite popular perception to the contrary, the Hoover Administration 
had not stood idle since 1929.  Towards the end of his term, Hoover 
boosted federal construction, tried to raise agricultural prices, and sought 
new funding for the mortgage market under the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Act.  He also preceded FDR in using military metaphor to fight economic 
malaise.  In December 1931, Hoover proposed to establish the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, modeled after the War Finance 
Corporation of World War I, to channel money to banks, municipalities 
and railroads.140  Yet the government response was generally limited to 
voluntary programs, exhortations, and subsidies for intermediaries.  
Hoover opposed outright mandates for banks and government relief 
                                                                                                                          
137 See Adam S. Posen, Introduction: Financial Similarities and Monetary Differences, in 
JAPAN’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 113, at 1, 7–10 
(setting aside monetary policy and discussing how a policy of regulatory forbearance failed to contain 
Japan’s financial crisis). 
138 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 18, 42 (1963) 
[hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT]. 
139 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY 1914–1932, at 247, 261–62 (1958) 
[hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY]. 
140 The idea to revive the War Finance Corporation originally came from Federal Reserve 
Chairman Eugene Meyer.  James L. Butkiewicz, The Impact of a Lender of Last Resort During the 
Great Depression: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 32 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. 
HIST. 197, 199 (1995).  LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 257–58.  Although RFC 
support may have slowed the rate of failure among recipients, it did not spur net new lending, since the 
banks had become risk-averse.  Id. 
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payments to individuals.141  Instead, he tried to jawbone financial industry 
captains over dinner and to shame them with Congressional probes.142  
Hoover also set up a vehicle for the strong banks to help the weak (they did 
not).143 
States filled the void with mandates of their own.  By the time of 
Roosevelt’s inauguration, many had imposed foreclosure moratoria; nearly 
all had some form of banking restrictions.144 
FDR’s inaugural address on March 4 was laced with war imagery and 
broadsides against “money changers.”145  On March 5, he used wartime 
emergency powers to declare a national bank holiday.146  In the words of 
one historian, “[t]he very totality of the bank holiday helped snap the 
tension the country had been under all winter.”147  The same measure 
banned transactions in gold as a first step to dollar devaluation.148  News 
headlines warned of “Prison for Gold Hoarder.”149  Legislation validating 
                                                                                                                          
141 LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 252, 257–58; BARRIE A. WIGMORE, THE 
CRASH AND ITS AFTERMATH: A HISTORY OF SECURITEIS MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1929–
1933,  209–12 (1985). 
142 LEUCHTENBERG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 251–59; SELIGMAN, supra note 66, at 8–9, 
11–13 (describing Hoover’s dinners with bankers and stock exchange officials and his role in launching 
Senate Banking Committee hearings into Wall Street misdeeds). 
143 LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, 257–58; Butkiewicz, supra note 140, at 199 
(describing, among other things, the establishment of the National Credit Corporation); cf. Robert F. 
Bruner & Sean D. Carr, Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 1907, 19 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 115, 
122 (2007) (describing the efforts of J.P. Morgan and other New York bankers to stop market panic in 
1907 by backing weaker institutions); NAKASO, supra note 5, at 1, 10–11 (describing Japanese 
government policies encouraging strong banks to rescue weak ones); Grace Wong, Wall Street 
Superfund: Not So Super, CNNMONEY, Oct. 22, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/22/ 
markets/super_fund/index.htm (describing a U.S. Treasury Department effort to get banks to pool 
resources to buy distressed financial assets, announced on October 15, 2007). 
144 BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 1919–1939, 329 (1996); LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, 38–39, 42–43 
(1963).   
145 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s First Inaugural Address, supra note 40; see Belknap, supra note 
36, at 67–68 (describing the war analogy). 
146 Bank Holiday, March 6–9, 1933, Inclusive, Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689–91 (1933); 
Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95 et 
seq. (2000)); Belknap, supra note 36, at 73.  Roosevelt approved the issuance of the proclamation on 
the afternoon of Sunday, March 5.  LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 42 (1963). 
147 LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, 42 (1963). 
148 Bank Holiday, March 6–9, 1933, Inclusive, Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689–91 (1933); 
Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95 
(2000)); Belknap, supra note 36, at 73.  Roosevelt did not formally devalue until January 30, 1934, 
after a series of interim legislative and executive measures.  See Agricultural Adjustment Act, 73 Pub. 
L. No. 10, 48 Stat 31 (1933) (giving the Executive discretion to inflate); Gold Reserve Act, 48 Stat. 337 
(1934) (mandating a 40% minimum reduction in the gold value of the dollar).  For a discussion of the 
Administration’s gold buying program and other initiatives to promote commodity price inflation, see, 
for example, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 1933–1935, 197–252 
(1959); LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 78–84 (1963); see also Kenneth W. Dam, 
From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 504, 512–15 (1983). 
149 Use of Scrip Authorized: President Takes Steps Under Sweeping Law of War Time, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1933, at 1. 
 1090 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1051 
the President’s actions and expanding his authority passed the Congress 
“sight unseen” on March 9 in an atmosphere that evoked “great war 
measures.”150  Sticks joined words and carrots in the containment toolkit. 
Roosevelt’s primary objective in delinking the dollar from gold was to 
inflate agricultural commodity prices.151  The move was also part of a 
national recovery policy that sought to redistribute power away from New 
York bankers to Western farmers and entrepreneurs;152 it was moreover a 
nationalist bid for policy autonomy amid the crumbling international gold 
standard.153  In the Administration’s way lay over $100 billion in face 
value of government and private debt contracts that gave creditors the 
option of payment in gold at the rates prevailing when the contract was 
made.154  Such “gold clauses” had become boilerplate after the last bout of 
dollar devaluation following the Civil War;155 by 1933, they were in over 
half of all debt, totaling more than 130% of GDP.156  The U.S. government 
was the largest debtor affected, with $22 billion in gold clause debt in June 
1933, followed by state and municipal governments at $14 billion, 
railroads at $11 billion, $34 billion for other domestic corporations, and 
$10 billion issued by foreign entities.157 
The clauses were designed as a hedge against precisely the sort of 
move contemplated by FDR.158  They were a policy problem because they 
had become ubiquitous:159 if they were enforced, public and private debt 
                                                                                                                          
150 LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 43–44 (1963). 
151 Id. at 48; see also Dam, supra note 148, at 511–13 (1983).  For a contemporary perspective, 
see Charles S. Collier, Gold Contracts and Currency Regulation, 23 CORNELL L. Q. 520, 528, 532 
(1937–1938) (describing the Joint Resolution’s objective as “reflation of prices”). 
152 SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 233.  
153 See generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 35; SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 199–200, 221. 
154 Gold Obligations Are $100,000,000,000; Federal Bonds Total $22,000,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 1933, at 2; Randall S. Kroszner, Is it Better to Forgive than to Receive? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Impact of Debt Repudiation 2, 6 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business), available at http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/ 
randall.kroszner/research/repudiation4.pdf.  Some of the clauses were drafted to require payment in 
gold; others permitted payment of the specified gold value in paper dollars.  The second category 
presented a more difficult problem for the government in later litigation.  
155 Ignore Indenture Payable in Gold: Agents for Bonds with Coupons Due Fail to Give Coin 
When Demand Is Made; Court Action Possible; Issues of French Municipalities Soar in Price on Offer 
to Settle in Metal, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1933, at 2 (describing “the familiar clause”); Knox v. Lee and 
Parker v. Davis (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. 457 (1871); see also Juilliard v. Greenman (Legal 
Tender Case), 110 U.S. 421, 436, 449 (1884) (describing the post-Civil War acts passed by Congress to 
address dollar devaluation); see Levy, supra note 36 (discussing the Legal Tender Cases). 
156 Dam, supra note 148, at 523 (citing 55% of all debt); Kroszner, supra note 155 (citing two-
thirds).  
157 Gold Obligations Are $100,000,000,000; Federal Bonds Total $22,000,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 1933, at 2; Kroszner, supra note 154, at 2. 
158 Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 302 (1935); John P. Dawson, The Gold 
Clause Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REV. 647, 662–63 (1934–1935); Dam, supra note 148, at 522–23.  
159 Text of the Two Reports on the Gold Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1933, at 2: 
If the gold clause applied to a very limited number of contracts and security 
issues, it would be a matter of no particular consequence, but in this country 
virtually all obligations, almost as a matter of routine, contain the gold clause.  In 
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stock would rise by as much as 69% when the dollar fell against gold, 
triggering mass bankruptcy.160  On June 5, Congress passed and Roosevelt 
signed a Joint Resolution that made gold clauses in public and private debt 
unenforceable as against public policy.161  It was rushed through to allow 
the Treasury to issue new debt without the clauses on June 15.162  
Commodities rallied briefly;163 creditors sued. 
The first federal ruling came a year later when a district court in St. 
Louis held that a railroad’s promise to pay in gold was no more 
enforceable in the aftermath of the Joint Resolution than a promise to pay 
“100 piculs of Chinese opium.”164  Within months, four appeals were 
joined before the Supreme Court: two suits on railroad bonds (including 
the consolidated Missouri appeal), and two on U.S. government 
obligations.165 
In all four cases, the creditors claimed due process and takings 
violations; on the editorial pages, they pressed the image of a bank 
depositor arbitrarily denied access to his money.166  To the President and 
his allies, they were “no better than racketeers” trying to finagle $1.69 for 
their dollar.167 
For the Court, the private obligations presented the simplest 
problem.168  They plainly had to give way to Congress, since all those 
                                                                                                                          
light of … [pervasive gold hoarding and capital flight],  … no currency system … 
can meet the requirements of a situation in which many billions of dollars of 
securities are expressed in a particular form of the circulating medium, particularly 
when it is the medium upon which the entire credit and currency structure rests. 
160 See, e.g., Kroszner, supra note 154, at 2. 
161 H.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong., ch. 48, 48 Stat. 112 (1933).  The operative portion read: 
Resolved . . . That (a) every provision contained in or made with respect to any 
obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a 
particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States 
measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy; and no such provision 
shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred.  
Every obligation, heretofore or heareafter incurred, whether or not any such 
provision is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon 
payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is 
legal tender for public and private debts.  Any such provision contained in any law 
authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States, is 
hereby repealed . . . . 
162 Roosevelt Signs Gold Clause Ban: Resolution, Rushed to Cover June 15 Federal Issue, Put 
Into Effect Quickly; ‘Repudiation’ Is Denied, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1933, at 35. 
163 SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 236. 
164 In re Missouri Pacific R. Co., 7 F. Supp. 1, 9 (E.D. Mo. 1934); Court Knocks Out Bond Gold 
Clause, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1934, at 1. 
165 Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. and United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 
(1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
166 Norman C. Norman, Our Gold Certificates, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1933. 
167 ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 256 (1960).  
168 Seth P. Waxman, The Physics of Persuasion: Arguing the New Deal, 88 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2416 
(2000) (arguing that the private contracts cases were the easiest of the Gold Clause lot).  For a similar 
view from a contemporary, see, for example, John Dickinson, The Gold Decisions, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 
715, 720 (1935) and Dawson, supra note 158, at 664. 
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subject to “national power”—including private parties, states and 
municipalities—contracted subject to the Congress’s powers to regulate 
commerce, and certainly to establish the value of money.  Chief Justice 
Hughes wrote for the majority: 
There is no constitutional ground for denying to the 
Congress the power expressly to prohibit and invalidate 
contracts although previously made, and valid when made, 
when they interfere with the carrying out of the policy it is 
free to adopt.169 
Two aspects of the opinion stand out for purposes of this discussion.  
First, despite explicit reference to emergency in the preamble to the Joint 
Resolution, the Court refused to carve out a temporary emergency regime 
for contract abrogation.170  This followed from the court’s reliance on the 
last of the Legal Tender Cases, Juilliard v. Greenman, which upheld the 
government’s power after the Civil War to issue paper money and make it 
legal tender in peacetime.171  Second, also flowing from Juilliard, the 
Court would not limit the ruling strictly to the Congress’s power to coin 
money.  Instead, it affirmed Congressional capacity to strike contracts that 
interfered with its macroeconomic powers, broadly defined.172 
The clear and muscular tone of Norman was in contrast to the Chief 
Justice’s argument in Perry v. U.S., a suit to enforce gold clauses in the 
                                                                                                                          
169 Norman, 294 U.S. at 309–10, (1935). 
170 Cf. Summary of the brief of Bankers Trust in Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. and United 
States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240:  
This Resolution is not, and does not purport to be, an emergency measure.  
Besides, if this were an emergency measure, it would end with the emergency and 
then the Railway Company would have to pay these bondholders what it agreed to 
pay.  But it purports to be legislation for all time. 
171 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1884). 
172 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935).  Congress clearly had the 
power to invalidate private contracts retroactively where they interfered with legitimate exercise of 
government power.  One contemporary commentator stressed that in all four cases, the majority and the 
dissent broke over whether the clauses did in fact interfere with any government power, and what that 
power was.  See generally, Collier, supra note 151.  Most agreed that the powers to coin currency and 
establish its value were central to the decision; however, under Juilliard, these were derived not just 
from the coinage power, but also from the taxing and borrowing powers of the government, among 
others.  Norman after Juilliard essentially cited the entire macroeconomic remit as the source of 
Congressional power at issue.  As noted earlier, most elite legal observers at the time considered 
Norman an easy case and were not surprised by the outcome.  See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 158, at 
664, 676 n.57 (“That the gold-clause resolution would be sustained by the Supreme Court was 
predicted in all the published discussions of the subject”); see also Dickinson, supra note 168, at 716; 
Richard Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and 
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1924 (1994) (“For the Justices that had 
constituted the majority in Blaisdell, this was an easy case.”).  The same view would likely prevail 
today.  See, e.g., Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: Winstar and the Need to 
Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 KY. L.J. 245, 285 & n.153 (“The Supreme 
Court has consistently applied rational basis review and upheld federal laws that trample quite blatantly 
on private contractual obligations,” citing among others Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A Gray 
& Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984)). 
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government’s World War I Liberty Bonds.173  Hughes first held on due 
process grounds that stripping the gold clauses from government debt was 
repudiation, exceeding any Congressional power over currency.174  Yet he 
also wrote that the Congress’s action caused the creditors no compensable 
damage, since government restrictions on gold made it impossible for 
creditors to obtain gold coin or sell it for paper dollars above the 
government-established value.  Moreover, deflation had increased the 
purchasing power of the dollar: in the minds of many (apparently including 
the Court), this would create a double windfall for the gold clause 
creditor.175 
Justice Stone’s concurrence barely disguised contempt for all the 
casuistry.  He would rather have ruled simply that the government’s power 
to issue enforceable debt could not trump its monetary power.  Most 
prominent critics agreed with Stone.176  In an emotional dissent and still 
more emotional remarks from the bench, Justice McReynolds compared 
FDR to Nero and declared the Joint Resolution an exercise in lawlessness, 
rights-trampling and repudiation.177  His opinion for the four dissenters 
covered all four cases; he found none more sympathetic than the other. 
The contrast between the majority’s construction of the gold clause 
                                                                                                                          
173 Another case involving gold certificates issued by the government was disposed of quickly on 
the theory that the certificates required payment in gold, whose value was determined solely by the 
U.S. government, and which were tendered before the devaluation of 1934.  Unable to sell gold on the 
world markets, the creditor sustained no meaningful loss and was therefore not entitled to sue in the 
Court of Claims.  Norz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935).  Perry potentially involved payment of 
gold value in paper dollars in connection with an obligation tendered after devaluation.   
Between the passage of the Joint Resolution and the time the cases were heard, the government’s 
gold clause debt had gone down to $12 billion, and was less than half the total debt stock as a result of 
refinancing with new, clause-free debt.  Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 349 (1935). 
174 Perry, 294 U.S. at 350, 354.  Hughes wrote that removing the gold clauses violated “a 
fundamental principle” guaranteeing “the integrity of the public obligations,” which he derived from 
the government’s power to incur debt and the statement that such debt was inviolable.  The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was “confirmatory” of the fundamental principle.  Id.; see also 
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV 
504, 539 (1987) (a summary of reactions to Perry among legal scholars in the 1930s). 
175 Dam, supra note 148, at 517, 525. 
176 Perry, 294 U.S. at 359–61 (Stone, J., concurring).  SCHLESINGER, supra note 167, at 259.  
Stone privately disapproved of the gold measure.  BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT 35 (1998).  Hughes’ opinion attracted scathing criticism for incoherence, and for leaving the 
door open to future lawsuits should the paper dollar decline in purchasing power terms.  See generally 
Dawson, supra note 158; Dickinson, supra note 168; Henry M. Hart, Jr., Gold Clause in United States 
Bonds, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1934–1935).  Judge Learned Hand complemented Stone and scoffed at 
Hughes’ attempt to “trick up” government debt: “‘Everybody dealing with a sovereign knows he is 
dealing with a creature who can welch if he wants to welch.  To trick up a lot of international stuff as 
though it were law frankly makes me puke, as dear old Holmes used to say.’”  SCHLESINGER, supra 
note 167, at 259–60; see also Friedman, supra note 172, at 1926, n.173; Currie, supra note 174, at 539. 
177 McReynolds’ passionate extemporaneous remarks were originally reported in the Wall Street 
Journal; a toned-down version appeared as the official dissent in the cases.  Perry, 294 U.S. at 361 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting); LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT, supra note 138, at 144; SCHLESINGER, 
supra note 168, at 260; Justice McReynolds’ Remarks on Gold Case Decision, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
1935, at 1. 
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episode, especially in Norman, as an exercise in regulation, and the 
dissent’s view of the same episode as a suspension of legality, is 
instructive.  It is essentially the difference between ordinary regulation and 
emergency discussed earlier in this article.  Yet the incident was neither 
ordinary nor lawless. 
All the Gold Clause Cases, but especially Norman, differed from the 
Court’s earlier validation of state foreclosure moratoria.  In Home Building 
& Loan v. Blaisdell, decided a year earlier, Hughes writing for the majority 
upheld Minnesota’s 1933 extension of the debtors’ right to redeem real 
property from foreclosure as a valid exercise of state police power in an 
emergency.178  To be sure, the Court was construing the Constitution’s 
explicit bar on state interference with private contracts.179  The Minnesota 
law also specifically limited itself to the duration of the emergency.  In the 
Gold Clause Cases and Blaisdell alike, emergency provided the context for 
the exercise of existing government power.  In Blaisdell unlike the others, 
it also provided the predicate and the time window.180 
Blaisdell moreover represented a different sort of interference in 
contracts.  Minnesota’s suspension of mortgage enforcement was 
discretionary and case-by-case, in the hands of a judge responding to a 
specific debtor’s application for relief.181  In contrast, the legislative history 
of the Joint Resolution, the arguments for the debtors and creditors, and the 
opinions in the Gold Clause Cases all emphatically divorced the 
government measure from any given party’s capacity to perform.  The gold 
clauses were a problem for the government across the board; all were 
stricken wholesale.182 
The immediate distribution effects of the gold measure are hard to 
discern.  On its face, the Joint Resolution was a radical move to transfer 
wealth from creditors to debtors.183  But who exactly held the debt and 
equity at the time?  Despite heated populist rhetoric, beneficiaries included 
some of the country’s richest men.  This is in part because holding 
                                                                                                                          
178 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
180 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n., 290 U.S. at 420; see GROSS & NI AIOLAIN, supra note 36, at 76–
77 (describing Blaisdell as an instance of “interpretive accommodation” of emergency powers by the 
judiciary). 
181 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n., 290 U.S. at 417–19.  Later some scholars argued that the judiciary 
was the more appropriate branch to deal with unsustainable gold clause contracts, and criticized the 
wholesale approach of the Joint Resolution: “A legislature, by its very nature, can have no knowledge 
of the intent of parties to individual private contracts, the very kind of factual determination courts are 
specially suited to decide.”  GOLD, MONEY AND THE LAW 5 (Manne & Miller eds., 1975). 
182 Text of the Two Reports on the Gold Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1933, at 2.  For 
example, Hart argued that the Gold Resolution could have been upheld with respect to government debt 
because it “was made to apply evenhandedly to all obligations,” including government and private 
bonds alike.  Hart, supra note 176, at 1092. 
183 Dam, supra note 148, at 521.  Although he explains the gold measure as primarily distributive, 
not monetary, Dam acknowledges the ambiguous outcome of distribution in this case.  Id. 
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company pyramids that dominated corporate America at the time 
concentrated stock ownership in the hands of a few industry captains, and 
leveraged operating companies through massive bond issues and bank 
borrowing.184  As the largest debtors, the U.S. government, states, 
municipalities, and foreign governments, benefited too, and with them their 
taxpayers.185  Mortgagors and other individual debtors also had gold 
clauses in their long-term debt contracts and got relief; however, unlike 
corporate obligations, these are not documented in detail. 
The losers were not all widows and orphans either, despite passionate 
speeches to the contrary from the Congressional opponents of the Joint 
Resolution.186  Even as the Liberty Bond campaign and the 1920s boom 
brought new investors into the markets,187 the actual number of retail 
bondholders at the time of the crash was relatively small, likely fewer than 
a million.188  Banks, pension and insurance companies dominated; banks 
were especially vulnerable in light of their huge “security loan” operations, 
which effectively underwrote a large portion of the country’s retail 
investing adventures.189 
Notwithstanding any direct redistribution effected by the Joint 
Resolution, both stocks and bonds rallied on news of the Supreme Court 
decisions in the Gold Clause Cases.190  Randall Kroszner’s recent study of 
the market reaction suggested that the bondholders may have seen debt 
relief as contributing to their debtors’ capacity to pay.  Creditors also may 
have welcomed the certainty of having the abrogation question decided, 
and may have benefited directly from rising stock prices (according to 
another study, most corporate debt issues before the crash of 1929 had 
equity “kickers”).191 
The real distributive significance of the gold policies likely went 
                                                                                                                          
184 See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 101–02 (1946) (describing the leverage 
problem in utility holding companies); EDWIN P. HOYT, JR., THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 375 (1966) 
(discussing the prevalence of holding companies in the corporate sector generally); SELIGMAN, supra 
note 66, at 129–30 (describing holding company structures).  The effect of Roosevelt’s gold policy on 
the debt stock of his companies may have contributed to J.P. Morgan’s support for going off the gold 
standard.  SCHLESINGER, supra note 148, at 202 (1958).  High leverage was not limited to holding 
company pyramids.  Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, one of the defendants in the Gold Clause Cases, was 
both notably leveraged and operationally vulnerable.  WIGMORE, supra note 141, at 37. 
185 Gold Obligations Are $100,000,000,000; Federal Bonds Total $22,000,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 1933, at 2. 
186 Text of the Two Reports on the Gold Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1933, at 2 (minority 
report). 
187 CHARLES CORTEZ ABBOTT, THE NEW YORK BOND MARKET 1920–1930, 52–53, 153 (1937); 
SELIGMAN, supra note 66, at 25. 
188 LEUCHTENBURG, PROSPERITY, supra note 139, at 241. 
189 ABBOTT, supra note 187, at 37–39, 154, 182–83.  “Security loan” refers to bank lending for the 
purchase of securities, not the lending of securities themselves.  But see WIGMORE, supra note 141, at 
287, 552–53 (describing small bank sales of railroad bonds in 1931, and banks’ withdrawal from the 
corporate bond market in favor of U.S. Treasuries). 
190 See generally Kroszner, supra note 154. 
191 WIGMORE, supra note 141, at 27.  
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beyond the parties to the gold clause obligations.  As noted earlier, it was 
about the relative power of bankers, farmers and upstart entrepreneurs, and 
the structure of the economy to come. 
D.  Argentina 2001–-2002 
Kroszner’s study of market response to the Gold Clause Cases began 
making the rounds in the late 1990s, with obvious policy relevance in the 
wake of the Asian financial crisis.192  However, it was not until Argentina’s 
foreign bond default and mass redenomination of domestic dollar contracts 
in 2001-2002 that FDR’s gold lessons were applied directly in a 
contemporary context.193 
To put Argentina’s latest crisis response in context, it helps to go back 
to another crisis a decade earlier.  Facing hyperinflation, a mountain of 
debt and a spate of bank runs, Argentina imposed a bank holiday and 
mandated the exchange of domestic term bank deposits into government 
bonds in January 1990.194  When depositors sued, Argentina’s highest court 
reached for its own 1930s jurisprudence, which upheld a foreclosure 
moratorium and interest rate caps on economic emergency grounds.  The 
1934 Argentine ruling relied explicitly on Blaisdell and a doctrine of 
economic emergency.195 
In an effort to stabilize prices and perhaps prevent future crises, 
Argentina pegged its currency at par to the U.S. dollar.  Initially successful 
against hyperinflation, this “convertibility” regime framed Argentine 
politics and economic development in the 1990s.  But in the second half of 
the decade, the dollar gained in value as Argentine exports stagnated.  The 
government was locked into massive fiscal transfers. 
After a series of external shocks and four years of recession, Argentina 
defaulted on $100 billion in debt and abandoned convertibility on 
Christmas Eve 2001.  The legislature also passed a law converting dollar-
denominated debts under $100,000 into pesos at 1:1.  In February 2002, 
the Executive promulgated an emergency decree redenominating all dollar 
                                                                                                                          
192 The paper was presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition in May 1999, entitled “Global Financial Crises:  Implications for Banking 
and Regulation” (program at http://www.chicagofed.org/news_and_conferences/conferences_and_ 
events/bsc_1999.cfm). 
193 Calomiris et al., supra note 58, at 14 (citing Kroszner’s study in the Argentina case study); 
Kroszner, supra note 154, at 1, 4–6 (drawing a parallel between the gold clause episode and 
Argentina’s “pesoification”). 
194 Int’l Monetary Fund Pol’y Dev. & Rev. Dep’t, Sovereign Debt Restructurings and the 
Domestic Economy: Experience in Four Recent Cases 14 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/NP/pdr/sdrm/2002/022102.pdf (describing “Plan BONEX”). 
195 Spector, supra note 11, at 135–38.  The Contract Clause and federalism concerns of the U.S. 
constitution, prominent in Blaisdell, did not appear to migrate into Argentine jurisprudence. 
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contracts and bank deposits into deeply devalued pesos.196  However, the 
“pesification” was asymmetric: debts to banks were converted 1:1, while 
deposits got a boost at 1:1.4.  The reasons for the precise number 
difference are murky; the result was that at least initially, banks were stuck 
with subsidizing their debtors and their depositors to the tune of forty cents 
on the dollar. 
During the last year before default, banks had suffered a series of runs 
and had become deeply undercapitalized.  Bank owners complained 
bitterly about the asymmetric aspect of pesification and threatened to walk 
away from their banks.  The government soon relented and issued domestic 
law, dollar-denominated compensation bonds to banks.  The banks would 
carry the debt on their books at face value, despite the fact that the 
government was in default on $100 billion in foreign debt.  On the other 
hand, the government scrupulously serviced over $20 billion in new 
domestic bonds even as it kept its old foreign bondholders out in the cold.  
This attempt to subordinate foreign creditors compounded the effects of 
debt reprofiling operations in late 2001, which allowed Argentina to 
separate domestic and foreign creditors and engage in selective default.197 
The “pesification” measures had a profound economic impact because 
dollar contracts were so prevalent in Argentina before default.  Pesification 
brought as much as 75% debt relief for large companies, but also for scores 
of small debtors.  A recent study suggests that the measure also promoted 
quick resumption of investment by large firms, and contributed to the 
recovery of Argentina’s banking sector.198 
The legal fallout was somewhat more complex.  Most of the 
emergency measures were ultimately upheld, though not before politically-
charged personnel changes on the Argentine Supreme Court.  The court 
continued to use its Blaisdell-inspired jurisprudence to imply broad 
emergency powers in the Executive to modify contracts.199 
The Argentine courts’ reliance on Blaisdell to uphold redenomination 
is notable, since the U.S. case was decided under the Contract Clause and 
                                                                                                                          
196 Id. at 139; The Republic of Arg., Prospectus Supplement, at 112–14 (Dec. 27, 2004), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/914021/000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm#108; 
see STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32, at 182–86 (describing pesification, subsequent 
lawsuits and compensation awards). 
197 MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 42–49, 74–75 
(2002); STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 32, at 177–87. 
198 See generally Calomiris et al., supra note 58 (comparing Argentina’s case favorably with 
Mexico’s in the aftermath of the 1994–1995 crisis; Mexico devalued, but did not redenominate, and 
suffered a much slower recovery of investment). 
199 Spector, supra note 11, at 142–44 (pointing to the reliance of the Argentine courts on Home 
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell in the Bustos v. Estado Nationale / amparo and Massa v. Poder 
Ejecutivo National—DecretoNo. 1.570/01 cases applying the doctrine of economic emergency 
(citations omitted)).  However, in a handful of earlier and lower court cases, the government was 
mandated to pay compensation.  Spector, supra note 11, at 140 (discussing Smith v. P.E.N. / medidas 
cautelares (citation omitted)). 
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was heavily influenced by federalism concerns.  Norman might have made 
for better precedent, if not a better transplant.  The explanation may be as 
simple as timing: the leading Argentine case transplanting Blaisdell was 
decided in 1934, before the U.S. Supreme Court had spoken on the Gold 
Clause Cases.  Like Blaisdell, the 1934 Avico case dealt with mortgage 
foreclosures.200  Subsequent cases reviewing currency crisis measures cited 
to the 1934 domestic precedent.  But there may be a thicker explanation, 
such as the Argentine legal system’s preference for a distinct legal regime, 
specified ex-ante, to govern emergencies.201  The Norman model of 
workaday regulation, which can look strained even at home, would not fit 
well with a state of siege regime for addressing financial crisis. 
In retrospect, Argentina’s approach to debt distress in the middle of its 
last currency crisis was unusual for making the government’s distribution 
policies explicit.  An early attempt to limit debt relief to small contracts 
gave way to general debt reduction, which at first was going to be funded 
out of bank capital.202  When banks turned out to be insolvent and 
protested, the cost of the debtor subsidy shifted to the general public.  This 
may have privileged large domestic firms and the middle class, who could 
borrow in dollars before the crisis, relative to the poor.  Argentina’s 
lengthy default on foreign bonds helped shift some cost onto foreign 
creditors. 
E.  Mexico 1982 
Each of the four case studies so far has had an international dimension.  
Indonesia’s currency collapse made its cross-border corporate debts 
unsustainable; Japan’s failing financial firms were deeply enmeshed in the 
global and regional markets; the United States’ gold policies were part of 
the demise of the international gold standard; and Argentina delinked its 
currency from the U.S. dollar and defaulted on its foreign bonds.  My last 
case study offers a twist on cross-border crisis management. 
What came to be known as the Third World Debt Crisis took up most 
of the 1980s and early 1990s.203  Its origins are commonly traced to oil 
                                                                                                                          
200 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico, Don Oscar Agustín v. de la Pesa, don 
Saúl G. / sobre consignación de intereses,” Fallos (1934-172-21) (Arg.), http://www.garridocordobera. 
com.ar/pagina_ nueva_572.htm. 
201 GROSS & NI AOLAIN, supra note 36, at 26–27 (discussing the use of the French “state of siege” 
model of emergency legality in Latin America, including Argentina); see also Spector, supra note 11, 
at 134. 
202 Spector, supra note 11, at 139. 
203 The crisis is the subject of an enormous literature, primarily in economics and political 
science.  For an authoritative treatment by a law scholar, see ROSS P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS 
DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 5–24 (1999).  See generally THE INTERNATIONAL 
DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert, eds., 1989) 
(providing an economic and political science perspective); DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989) (economics); BARBARA STALLINGS & ROBERT 
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price shocks of the 1970s, which filled U.S. and U.K. banks with deposits 
from oil-exporting economies.  The influx of “petrodollars” in turn 
catalyzed a bank lending spree throughout the developing world, but 
especially in Latin America, where governments and private firms 
borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars from foreign banks.204  A world 
recession and spiking interest rates in the lending countries brought the 
boom to a screeching halt in August 1982. 
In the much-repeated account of one U.S. Treasury official, on August 
13, 1982, Mexico’s Finance Minister Jesus Silva Herzog “showed up on 
our doorstep and turned his pockets inside out.”205  Having borrowed 
upwards of $50 billion dollars from foreign banks,206 Mexico was having 
trouble refinancing its debt, and was hemorrhaging reserves.  After a week 
of intense talks with U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve, and international 
officials, the Finance Minister told a room of 800 bankers in New York 
that Mexico was out of money, and asked for a 90-day moratorium on 
principal payments.207  An advisory committee of large and highly exposed 
banks was formed to help coordinate the refinancing of private debt in 
tandem with support from the IMF and other foreign public sources.208 
The wholesale, yet nominally voluntary, approach was orchestrated by 
U.S. and international finance officials.  It became a model for crises to 
come.  By October 1983, twenty-seven countries had followed in Mexico’s 
footsteps.209  The approach made sense because the debtors’ problems were 
to an extraordinary degree the problems of the U.S. banking sector.  In the 
words of one Mexican participant: 
We didn’t crawl to the international financial community 
as debtors seeking relief through some minor adjustment that 
could be made backstage.  We walked through the front door.  
We said we had a major problem with a capital P.  We didn’t 
say the problem was a particular debt.  We said the problem 
                                                                                                                          
R. KAUFMAN, DEBT AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (1989) (political science); Jeremy Bulow & 
Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining-
Theoretic Framework, 35 IMF STAFF PAPERS 644 (1988) (economics); Nelson, supra note 57 (political 
science). 
204 WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT REEXAMINED 60 (1995) (listing Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Venezuela and the Philippines as the five largest debtors, accounting for over 70% of total 
developing countries’ external debt in 1982); see also KARIN LISSAKERS, BANKS, BORROWERS AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT: A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 84 (1991) 
(noting that most private sector debt was assumed by the governments in the course of the crisis). 
205 LISSAKERS, supra note 204, at 84. 
206 CLINE, supra note 204, at 61 (citing Bank for International Settlements statistics).  This was 
over 50% of the size of the economy, and over 300% of Mexico’s exports.  Id. at 66.  Other sources cite 
debt stock figures as high as $80 billion.  JOSEPH KRAFT, THE MEXICAN RESCUE 4, 35 (1984). 
207 See KRAFT, supra note 206, at 21–22 (offering a detailed journalistic account of the drama 
surrounding Mexico’s moratorium). 
208 See id. 
209 BUCKLEY, supra note 203, at 6. 
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was the whole international financial structure.  We said it 
was everybody’s problem.210 
This was not a wild exaggeration.  In 1982, 17% of Chase bank’s 
assets were in Latin America and the Caribbean; the figures were similar 
for Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical, and other major U.S. 
banks.  Some of the largest U.S. banks derived a third of their net income 
in 1982 from operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, which had 
been growing rapidly over the previous decade.211  U.S. bank exposure to 
developing country debt stood at 166% of total bank capital in 1982; 
Mexico alone accounted for over a third.212  At a time when the U.S. 
banking system was undercapitalized, under-provisioned, and already 
straining from domestic economic pressures, a cascade of developing 
country defaults presented “the risk of a 1930s-style international financial 
crisis.213 
In October 1982, the IMF proposed to lend Mexico more money, but 
only if the private banks would do the same.  Just then, U.S. regulators let 
it be known that participating banks would not have to make loan-loss 
provisions on Mexican loans on the theory that concerted action would 
make Mexico a better credit prospect.214  The public premise behind the 
initial concerted lending strategy was that the borrowing countries were 
illiquid, not insolvent, and capable of recovering without debt reduction.215  
The initial refinancings were thus negotiated case-by-case at market rates, 
which contributed to a sharp rise in the debt stock of the borrowing 
countries, which in turn exacerbated their economic decline.216  Put 
differently, the new loans in the first instance stuck the Mexican 
government and its tax paying public with the full burden of unraveling 
foreign banks’ risky loans.  With U.S. banks lacking capital and loan-loss 
cushions, and with U.S. regulators unwilling to see mass bank failure, the 
initial response to developing country debt difficulties concentrated losses 
with the borrowing populations. 
By 1989, the approach shifted again.  The debt crisis showed few signs 
                                                                                                                          
210 Angel Gurria, quoted in KRAFT, supra note 206, at 3. 
211 See RAUL L. MADRID, OVEREXPOSED: U.S. BANKS CONFRONT THE THIRD WORLD DEBT 
CRISIS 48–49, 59 (1990). 
212 CLINE, supra 204, at 72–73. 
213 Id. at 205. 
214 See id. at 205–06. 
215 See id. at 92.  Over twenty years later, participants acknowledge, at least in private 
conversations, that the diagnosis of illiquidity was a product of the lenders’ inability to absorb the 
necessary losses at the time.   
216 See id. at 206–08; see also John Clark, Debt Reduction and Market Reentry Under the Brady 
Plan, 18 FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REV. 38, 39–40 (Winter 1993–94), available at http://www. 
nyfrb.org/research/quarterly_review/1993v18/v18n4article3.pdf (“By 1989, this basic case-by-case 
approach had achieved some measure of success . . . [n]onetheless, important strains had emerged, 
leading to deeping fatigue and frustration for both debtors and creditors.”). 
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of abating despite successive rescheduling innovations on the part of 
private and official participants.  Private banks grew wary of the endless 
stream of “voluntary” new lending, and were beginning to balk at official 
requests.217  But they also fortified themselves against further losses.  
Beginning in 1987, U.S. banks raised capital and set aside loan-loss 
provisions, with the largest banks booking “the worst . . . profits since the 
Great Depression” in the first year of the new strategy.218 
In 1989, the Brady Plan (named after the U.S. Treasury Secretary who 
presided over its launch) offered to exchange banks’ loans for tradable 
bonds, some collateralized with U.S. Treasury securities.  The plan was 
still technically voluntary.219  Principal reduction was the central plank of 
the plan, along with a standardized menu of restructuring options for 
creditors to choose from.  By some calculations, Mexico received in excess 
of 30% principal relief in its first Brady deal in 1990.220  Yet another round 
of regulatory forbearance helped boost participation: the U.S. Treasury 
secured an interpretation of accounting rules from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission that let banks avoid booking losses where the total 
principal and interest payments on the new bonds over their lifetime would 
“equal or exceed the book value of the loan.”221  With 30-year bonds, the 
standard was not hard to meet.  The loan-for-bond exchanges of the Brady 
Plan were a success by all counts, and eventually catalyzed the 
establishment of today’s market for middle-income countries’ sovereign 
debt.222 
* * * * * 
The case studies in this Part yield somewhat conflicting lessons.  On 
                                                                                                                          
217 See Lee C. Buchheit, Whatever Became of Old New Money? 9 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 11, 12 
(1990) (“The amounts raised have been relatively modest and the coupons relatively high, but these are 
unquestionably the first steps toward making good on the promise of ‘voluntary,’ open market 
operations.”). 
218 MADRID, supra note 211, at 126–36; see also Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady 
Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1802, 1818 (1998) 
[hereinafter, Buckley, Facilitation] (“[A]fter a major increase in reserves, prices dropped sharply as 
traders feared the extra supply of debt the banks could now afford to put onto the market.”); Clark, 
supra note 216, at 39 (observing that the “case-by-case approach had . . . afforded banks the time to 
increase their capital, thereby containing systemic threats to the international financial system”). 
219 See, e.g., CLINE, supra note 204, at 218. 
220 E.g., MADRID, supra note 211, at 220–22; see also Clark, supra note 216, at 46. 
221 Letter form Edmund Coulson & Linda C. Quinn (SEC Officials) to David C. Mulford 
(Treasury Department), reprinted in Jonathan Hay & Narmaljit Paul, Regulation and Taxation of 
International Commercial Banks During Debt Crisis 126 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 158) 
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/ 
23/000178830_98101904141457/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf; see also Buckley, Facilitation, supra 
note 218, at 1807–08 (“The prospects of the Brady proposal were greatly enhanced by a letter of July 
14, 1989 from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to David Mulford, Under Secretary 
of the Treasury.”). 
222 See Buckley, Facilitation, supra note 218, at 1887–89 (discussing the market benefits 
attributed to implementation of the Brady Plan). 
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the one hand, each of the very different governments involved, when 
confronted with a severe financial crisis, had to make the choices I have 
grouped under the rubric of containment—whether to deploy wholesale 
measures to manage deep, widespread debt distress, whether to enforce 
private contracts and government regulations despite the risk of general 
default, and how to distribute losses.  On the other hand, the way in which 
the governments went about making containment choices reflected their 
very specific economic, political and institutional settings.  Factors such as 
pre-crisis wealth distribution and business organization, a prior history of 
financial crises, the cause and location of debt distress, and the legal 
institutions for handling crises and non-crisis debt problems, all layered on 
top of the general factors discussed in Part IV, helped determine the policy 
outcomes. 
Yet there were more commonalities.  In every case, officials knew the 
depth and breadth of the crisis before they had the political and legal 
capacity for adequate response.  Governments began with incremental 
measures premised on no or very limited insolvency, and continued on this 
path until they secured the political space and legal authority to deploy 
robust containment policies.  Collective action problems on a vast scale 
stood in the way of crisis response.  Non-crisis resolution and debt 
management tools proved inadequate to contain the crisis and had to be 
supplemented with some combination of new laws, dedicated institutions, 
and regulatory adjustment—a process that took months, sometimes years.  
Also in every case, containment policies began durable economic and 
political shifts, which continued through resolution and re-regulation.  And 
with the partial exceptions of the United States and Argentina case studies, 
major loss-distribution proceeded under the guise of loss-prevention, 
implemented by ostensibly apolitical actors—central banks, international 
institutions and even foreign bank regulators.  
I conclude below with more implications of these and other 
experiences with containment. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: CHOICES AT THE PRECIPICE 
This Article is an effort to map a category of decisions in financial 
crisis, decisions made as policy makers stand at the edge of economic 
catastrophe.  Such decisions are often framed as a failure of regulation, and 
a time for rule-breaking to be regretted when the storm passes.  I have 
argued that these decisions, which I group under the term financial crisis 
containment, are unavoidable.  They are also distinct from financial 
regulation, crisis prevention, and crisis resolution. 
I suggest that three kinds of policy decisions recur in very different 
financial crises: first, whether the response should be wholesale or case-by-
case; second, whether to enforce private contracts and government 
regulations; and third, how to allocate losses.  Importantly, this is not an 
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argument for or against wholesale measures or breaking contracts.  Part V 
confirms that while containment choices are unavoidable, their outcomes 
are deeply contextual and contingent on a slew of political and institutional 
factors.  Rather, I suggest that the three-part framing in Part IV can help 
recast some well-worn crisis policy debates, and to make containment 
decisions more transparent and accountable. 
First, the choice between wholesale and case-by-case separates the 
timing of crisis response from the intractable liquidity-solvency paradigm.  
In the first instance, decisions about the timing of containment—and hence 
the timing of the crisis—go to the adequacy of the existing infrastructure 
for handling financial distress.  In every case study in Part V, governments 
struggled to adapt the existing tools to new circumstances, and found them 
wanting.  They were also pressed to build political support for 
extraordinary measures, which determined the timing of crisis response 
perhaps more than any other factor.   In most cases, the authorities knew 
they were dealing with a solvency problem long before they found the 
legal and political capacity to address it. 
What might make for better containment decisions in this context?  In 
many cases, non-crisis bankruptcy and resolution techniques can localize 
failure and limit the extent to which losses are socialized.  Having usable 
case-by-case restructuring tools and the political capacity to use them can 
limit the need for wholesale measures without shifting the losses onto the 
public.223  Under some circumstances, the fear of bankruptcy and judicial 
redistribution may beget a much bigger political risk of wholesale 
restructuring and nationalization.  But once the crisis has exceeded the 
administrative capacity of non-crisis tools, a qualitative shift is in order: 
simple, transparent, across-the-board measures that can work quickly and 
can be readily understood by both the public and the markets can be 
essential for containment.  Reform of the existing infrastructure and 
redress of containment inequities—long-range tasks that require complex 
balancing of many constituencies—belong with resolution and regulation; 
they demand more deliberation than containment can afford. 
Second, posing the choice between rewriting and enforcing contracts 
as inevitable puts the contract sanctity meme in a different light.  Where 
contract enforcement may have negative spillover effects, or where 
performance is possible only with a public subsidy, “sanctity” loses its 
absolute character and becomse a balancing test.  Policy focus shifts to 
assessing the spillover effects and the magnitude of the subsidy.  The 
question of rewriting contracts, like one of suspending regulation, becomes 
one of how much, how long, and how often.  Who does the rewriting is 
key:  for example, in the Argentina case study, the legislature and the 
                                                                                                                          
223 Cf. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 28. 
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Executive engaged in successive modifications; in the United States, the 
legislature remained the lead, albeit under heavy influence of a powerful 
Executive.  In both cases, the courts played a complex legitimating role. 
Having the power to rewrite contracts rest with the legislature seems 
appropriate for two reasons: it makes the power harder to exercise, and 
ensures broad-based accountability in the associated redistribution.  On the 
down side, a controversial decision to override contracts wholesale may 
take too long to be useful as containment.  But since the failure to act is 
distributive, the legislature remains accountable for the consequences of its 
inaction.  On the other hand, giving the red pen to the Executive may make 
rewriting contracts too easy, unless this authority is heavily circumscribed 
to avoid effectively creating a parallel bankruptcy regime.  
Third, stipulating distribution as a necessary element of containment 
recasts the perennial crisis policy debate about moral hazard.  Except 
where the policy is pristine abstention, the risk of moral hazard is 
unavoidable.  The operative question again becomes not whether the 
imprudent would be rescued, but rather which of the imprudent should be, 
at what cost, and at whose expense.  The debate becomes explicitly about 
distribution. 
To be sure, almost all government policies can distribute,224 but 
some—notably those that aim to contain a large-scale, fast-moving 
financial crisis—can obscure their effect on distribution, even when it is 
extreme.  The case of Indonesia in Part V.A is a stark, but not a unique, 
example of radically distributive policies that were rarely debated as 
such.225  The prevalence of central bank lending, even in well-known 
solvency crises, and the popularity of large “conduit” institutions as targets 
of government support, foster the impression that losses are avoidable, and 
that in any event, limiting total losses makes everyone better off.  By the 
time this strategy runs its course, resource and power shifts may become a 
source of path dependence.  After a crisis, some institutions and 
communities may be wiped out for good, while others may grow enormous 
from government-assisted mergers and subsidies.  The ethnic and political 
landscape may shift dramatically.226  
                                                                                                                          
224 Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36, at 45 (arguing that post-9/11 policies were distributive, 
like the U.S. financial crisis response in 2008). 
225 See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 38, at 89 (following general observations about bank closures 
in crisis: “All triggers must be designed to hold up legally, because interventions and closures will 
destroy and redistribute private property and wealth and therefore have a high likelihood of being 
challenged in courts”). 
226 See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY 
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 1–17 (2003) (evaluating ethnic and political 
repercussions of economic crises); see also Honohan & Laeven, Introduction and Overview, supra note 
19, at 10, 15 (highlighting the “potentially irreversible impact on the ultimate allocation of losses in the 
system,” rent-seeking opportunities, and durable political changes that stem from containment 
policies). 
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The possibility of dramatic and durable distribution should be an 
important factor in allocating containment authority.  Scholars in different 
disciplines have observed that the Executive tends to gain in crisis; some 
have suggested it is inevitable and probably sensible.227  Less prominent 
but critically important is the rising stock of independent agencies, notably 
central banks, whose lending authorities can become indispensable to the 
political branches in the containment project.228  The courts are often 
marginal in a fast-moving crisis, though they may gain power in a 
protracted one: it took over a year for the Gold Clause Cases to reach the 
U.S. Supreme Court, but their political and economic salience for crisis 
containment remained high.229  The legislators’ role is harder to gauge: 
they may be slow and unmotivated230 but they can also serve important—if 
disorderly—gatekeeping and legitimating functions when the Executive 
and independent agencies come to it for new authority.  Perhaps more 
importantly, legislative debates and hearings can condition the politics of 
crisis response: they can spread public awareness of dire economic 
circumstances and chart a course for both containment and reform.231 
The Executive’s role in a financial crisis and its relationship with the 
monetary authorities go to the heart of the containment challenge.  The 
Executive is presumed to be politically accountable; it can act quickly and 
flexibly, integrating diverse policy areas in its crisis response.232  However, 
the Executive’s authority to distribute is circumscribed by the legislature, 
and its actions are more visible than those of the central bank—an attribute 
of accountability that can make the Executive politically vulnerable.  In 
theory, the central bank is technically competent and better able to guard 
against time inconsistency, which is a particular problem in crisis 
containment; however, it is poorly placed to preside over messy, large-
                                                                                                                          
227 See generally Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36, at 16. 
228 See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 36, at 4 (describing the U.S. Treasury and 
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own political legitimacy deficit.  Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36, at 34–35 (citing Neal Devins & 
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Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459 (2008)).  It is not clear whether the power balance reversed in crisis, 
where the central bank in particular has more resources and authority. 
229 See Levy, supra note 36, at 800–02; supra notes 188–224 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Gold Clause Cases).  The same may be said about the judiciary’s response to Argentina’s 
pesification.  See supra notes 233–47 and accompanying text (discussing Argentina’s pesification). 
230 Posner & Vermuele, supra note 36, at 21 (suggesting that legislators have trouble responding 
to complexity). 
231 See, e.g., Bear Stearns Hearings, supra note 1 (discussing the merger of Bear Stearns and 
JPMorgan Chase); cf. SELIGMAN, supra note 66, at 21–38 (describing the Pecora Hearings and their 
role in the subsequent overhaul of financial regulation). 
232 See generally Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Bureaucrats of Politicians?  Part II: 
Multiple Policy Tasks, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 426, 427 (2007) (discussing the modeling policy making in 
general, not during crisis). 
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scale distribution.  The central bank’s expansive powers to lend and create 
money are premised on the idea that it does not distribute.233   
An Executive that is facing a hostile legislature—or is otherwise 
politically vulnerable—may come to need the central bank in crisis not just 
for its traditional monetary policy functions, but for its regulatory and less 
traditional transactional powers.234  Collaborating with the central bank 
may help the Executive to avoid the legislature, but also to diminish 
accountability at the height of the crisis.  If crisis containment were a 
purely technical project with fixed distributional consequences, this would 
be a minor concern.  But it rarely, if ever, is purely technical.  The result 
can be damaging for both the Executive and the central bank:  where their 
containment collaboration is perceived as illegitimate, it may fail, and 
result in loss of crisis-management authority going forward.  Regulators 
and foreign actors, such as the IMF, stand in a similar relationship to the 
Executive:  they can be its indispensable partners in containment, but can 
also help reduce accountability and get caught in the political fallout. 
The intricate tradeoffs of allocating authority over crisis containment, 
and more broadly crisis response, merit more study beyond the scope of 
this Article.  Perhaps the biggest question, explored in proposals such as 
“Super Chapter 11” and echoing the emergency literature, is whether there 
should be a standing ex-ante legal regime for crisis containment.  The 
advantage is predictability.  The fear is that governments will be tempted 
to use emergency powers willy-nilly, at best requiring constant 
recalibration of ex-ante procedural hurdles.  This Article suggests that 
many if not most of the tools of crisis containment are within the existing 
scope of government authority.  The challenge is to use them in a way that 
is legitimate and accountable. 
My goal has been to draw attention to containment policies as a 
distinct category of policy choice that deserves more analytical scrutiny 
than it has received to date.  The core consistency of crisis policies across 
very different cultural, institutional, and historical settings is revealing.  
Crisis response is necessarily fraught with moral hazard and political risk. 
Containment measures inevitably contravene non-crisis policy wisdom and 
legal norms. But governments and private actors invoke extraordinary 
measures routinely.  Acknowledging that crises will return, rules will be 
suspended, and emergency tools will be used, should prompt a critical 
examination of when, how, by whom, and to whose benefit. 
 
                                                                                                                          
233 Id.  The Federal Reserve’s “industrial policy” function has been controversial.  Its power to 
lend to nonbanks under Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act is subject to procedural hurdles, has been 
criticized throughout its history, and was used sparingly before 2008.  See Fettig, supra note 55. 
234 See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 36, at 12, 14 (describing transactions under the authority of 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act).  See also supra note 55. 
